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The Contributions Of Warfare With Revolutionary And Napoleonic 
France To The Consolidation And Progress Of The British Industrial 
Revolution∗ 
Patrick Karl O’Brien  
 
“Great Britain is under weightier obligation to no mortal man than to this 
very villain. For whereby the occurrences whereof he is the author, her 
greatness prosperity, and wealth, have attained their present elevation.” 
A Prussian General’s reference to Napoleon at the Congress of Vienna, 18151 
 
 Abstract 
My essay surveys a range of printed secondary sources going back 
to publications of the day (and includes research in primary sources) in 
order to revive a traditional and unresolved debate on economic 
connexions between the French and Industrial Revolutions.  It argues 
that, on balance, the costs flowing from the reallocation of labour capital 
and technical knowledge to wage warfare from 1793-1815 have been 
overstated in relation to the range of benefits analysed below that 
accrued from: crowding out a potential invasion by Napoleon’s armies; 
improvements to the skills and discipline of the workforce; the integration 
of Ireland into a national market; the accelerated diffusion of technologies 
associated with coal and iron; the circumvention of diminishing returns to 
agriculture and above all from a victory that left the Royal Navy with 
undisputed command of the oceans and the realm’s maritime sector, 
poised and ready to retain most of the gains from trade and servicing the 
international economy, obtained at the expense of rivals during these long 
wars with France. 
My conclusion is that the costs and benefits derived from 
participation in a global war from 1793 to 1815, that was integral to the 
era’s geopolitical and mercantilist international economic order could 
never be measured.  But in the context and history of that order it is 
difficult to represent their outcome as anything other than positive and 
significant for the consolidation and progress of Britain’s famous transition 
to become Europe’s First Industrial nation. 
 
 
∗  Not to be cited without permission from: p.o’brien@lse.ac.uk. I wish to thank Phil 
Hoffman, Stan Engerman, Mark Harrison and Javier Cuenca Esterban for their 
comments and help with this paper. 
1 A Prussian general’s reference to Napoleon at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 cited 
by A.D. Harvey, Collision of Empires. Britain in Three World Wars 1793-1815 (London, 
1945), 
  
2
                                                           
1. Quantifying the Impact of Warfare upon Economic Growth 
Between the Peace of Paris (1763) and the adoption of free trade 
(1846-49) the economy of the United Kingdom passed through an 
accelerated phase of industrialization and urbanization, referred to as the 
First Industrial Revolution. For more than a third of that time the British 
state was extracting and mobilizing resources (labour, capital, raw 
materials, intermediate and consumption goods) for purposes of:  
preparing, waging and disengaging from warfare with enemies from the 
mainland of Europe, failing to repress rebellions by colonists in the 
Americas, and defeating Indian, Chinese and other armed forces in 
various parts of the world.2 
The conflicts conducted between 1793 and 1815 in the middle of  
this famous conjuncture in British economic history should be  
comprehended historiographically (as they were by contemporaries) as 
part of a long sequence of mercantilist competition accompanied by 
violent strife, going back to the First Anglo-Dutch war of 1651. It will be 
represented here as the culmination of a  connected sequence of wars 
that accompanied the rise of the realm to the position of geopolitical, 
commercial and economic hegemony it occupied for something like a 
century after the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, when “Britain’s military and 
diplomatic prestige touched a pitch it has never reached before or since. 3 
Connexions between around  fourteen politically distinct conflicts 
and  the long-run growth of the national economy preoccupied statesmen 
and their mercantilist advisers between 1651 and 1815.4 They conceived 
 
2 D. Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1967) and D. 
McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815 (London, 1983) and 
P. Marshall, (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vols. 1-3 (Oxford, 1998) 
3 The quote is from Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad and Dangerous People. England 1783-
1846 (Oxford, 2006), p. 237;   J.R. Jones, Britain and the World, 1649-1815 (Brighton, 
1980) and L. Stone (ed.), An Imperial State at War from 1689-1815 (London, 1994). J. 
Black, Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy 1689-1815 (London, 2007). 
4 L. Gomes, Foreign Trade and the National Economy (London, 1987) and T.W. 
Hutchinson, Before Adam Smith The Emergence of Political Economy (Oxford, 1988). 
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of clear and positive correlations between power and profit. As  Charles 
Wilson observed: their “logic was the logic of violence in an age of 
violence”.5 While a later dominant tradition in English political economy 
running from Adam Smith to Maynard Keynes  has  influenced 
generations of liberal economic historians to regard  all wars as inimical 
for material progress and for the welfare of British society.6 
There is a literature, even a journal on the economics of war, but 
modern historians are understandably more chary than economists in 
entering debates that attempt to investigate the economic consequences 
of wars.7 They prefer to concentrate upon their origins and political 
outcomes or to conduct more manageable research into the mobilization 
of resources for engagement in power politics in order to expose and 
analyse wars as integral to processes of state formation in early modern 
Europe.8 Clearly conclusions (or even conjectures) about outcomes from 
wars for the histories of  national economies will be much more difficult to 
support with reference to evidence hard enough to draw clear inferences 
about their costs and benefits or to measure connexions between active 
 
5 C. Wilson, England’s Apprenticeship, 1603-1763 (New York, 1968)p. 67  and K Tribe, 
‘Mercantilism and the Economics of State Formation’ in L. Magnusson (ed.), 
Mercantilist Economics  (Northwell, 1993), pp. 175-86;  E . and S. Reinert, 
‘Mercantilism and Economic Development: Schumpeterian Dynamics, Institution 
Building and International Benchmarking’ in K. S. Jomo and E. Reinert (eds.), 
Development Economics. How Schools of Economic Thought  have Addressed 
Development (London, 2005). 
6 They are more inclined to use economics to explain military history. Vide J. Brauer 
and H. Van Tulyll, How Economists Explains  Military History (Chicago, 2008); E. 
Silberner, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought (Princeton, 
1946). 
7 V.W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and 
Technology Development (Oxford, 2006). E.L. Bogart, Direct and Indirect Costs of the 
Great War (New York, 1920); A.O. Bowley, Some Economic Consequences of the 
Great War (London, 1930); G. Kennedy, Defense Economics  (London, 1983); S.N. 
Broadberry, ‘The Impact of World Wars on the Long Run Performance of the British 
Economy’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 4 (1988), pp. 25-37; T. Sandler and K. 
Hartley, The Economics of Defence (Cambridge, 1995). 
8 F. Lane, Profits from Power. Readings in Protection, Rent and Violence  (Albany, 
1979); P.W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (Oxford, 1992) and S. 
Baxter , (ed.), England’s Rise to Greatness (Berkeley, 1983). 
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involvement in armed conflicts with rival powers on the one hand, with the 
long-term material progress on the other.9 
Engagements in war may have delayed, accelerated or arrested 
economic development. Counterfactuals are certainly implicit in any 
enquiry that poses the meta question about  their economic 
consequences and economists remain commendably explicit  in the 
parsimonious methods they utilize to deal with the key question of what 
might have occurred in the absence of mobilizations for warfare?  
Impatient with history, they cut through detailed investigations into its 
impact upon the factors of production (labour, capital, natural 
endowments and technology) behind economic growth. They also avoid 
difficulties involved in disaggregating the unmeasured and possibly un-
measurable effects of mobilization upon the distinct sectors and industries 
that make up national economies.  By making heroic assumptions that, in 
the absence of conflict, rates of growth for national incomes, industrial  
and agricultural outputs, labour productivities, consumption per capita and 
other macro-indicators of development would have continued on the 
trends observed and measured for runs of pre-war years, cliometricians 
posit that: without the interruptions and diversions associated with warfare 
these trends (as represented on several  varieties of growth curves 
invented by statisticians) would have persisted; that deviations from them 
are imputable to the malign effects of reallocating resources from the 
civilian economy into purposes directly or indirectly connected to armed 
conflict; and finally that estimated declines below trends represent the 
 
9 A. Milward, The Economic Effects of Two World Wars on Britain (London, 1984); R. 
Andreano (ed.), The Economic Impact of the American Civil War (Cambridge, Mass., 
1967); H.G. Vatter, The US Economy in World War II (New York, 1985). For recent 
attempts to construct theories that draw connexions between warfare and state 
formation vide T. Besley and T. Persson, ‘Wars and State Capacity’, in Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 2 (1009), pp. 522-30. 
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costs of war which cease to effect  long run growth once national 
economies are back upon their “normal” paths for growth.10 
Macro statistical exercises draw attention to familiar connexions. 
Firstly, that: war reduces a country’s capacity for steady growth; secondly, 
that social deprivation - in terms of private consumption foregone - and 
investment diverted - measured as a reallocation of investible savings to 
support expenditures by the state - rises in wartime, but then steadily 
diminishes when recovery carries national economies forward again; 
thirdly, that wars are accompanied and followed by shifts in the relative 
geopolitical positions of countries and thus their potential for future growth 
within the global economy at large.11 
Most historians of early modern Europe will not  be convinced that 
trends in production, investment or consumption could be defined ex post 
on the basis of accessible information for runs of so-called normal years, 
extrapolated forward through periods of war and recovery until an 
economy is back upon some kind of linear (or even non-linear) path for 
growth. They anticipate that more heuristic insights into the outcomes of 
early modern warfare might flow from investigations conducted war by 
war, factor by factor, sector by sector. They will also insist upon the 
separation of chronologies and perspectives so that distinctions can be 
made between the immediate and short-term impacts and longer term 
 
10 S. Kuznets, Postwar Economic Growth (New Haven, 1954); C. Goldin and F. Lewis, 
‘The Economic Cost of the American Civil War,’ in Journal of Economic History, 35 
(1975), p. 299-327 and C. Goldin and F. Lewis, ‘The Postwar. Recovery of the South 
and the Cost of the Civil War,’ Journal of Economic History, 38 (1978), pp. 487-492. 
11 M. Harrison, ‘Resource Mobilization for World War II: the USA, UK, USSR and 
Germany, 1938-15,’ in Economic History Review, 41 (1988), pp. 171-93; S. Broadberry 
and M. Harrison (eds.), The Economics of World War I (Cambridge, 2005) ; K. 
O’Rourke, ‘The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,’ in Journal of Global History, 1 (2006), pp. 123-49; R. 
Findlay and K. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty. Trade, War and the World Economy in the 
Second Millennium (Princeton, 2007). 
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structural effects of warfare upon the growth of Europe’s competing 
national economies.12 
 
 
2. Mercantilism, Warfare and the Rise of the British Economy 
Partly to avoid the almost insurmountable theoretical and empirical 
difficulties involved and no doubt  due also to a hegemonic liberal tradition 
of revulsion to the very notion that the celebrated and  precocious 
industrialization of the offshore  island can be plausibly represented as 
Europe’s  paradigm case of effective mercantilism, the historiography in 
print for British economic history is not replete with a significant volume of 
historical research and debate concerned with the costs and benefits of 
the states largely successful engagement in a sequence of  wars and 
numerous minor conflicts with other European and Asian powers between 
1651-1846.13 
As John Brewer, Lawrence Stone, Huw Bowen, Stephen Conway 
and others discovered when they published recent surveys of what is 
after all a major theme in British history, the anticipated programme of 
research, publication and discourse (concerned to synthesize connexions 
between warfare and the long run growth of the British or any other 
national economies) for an era of mercantilism is not out there in anything 
like the volume and depth that the topic warrants.14 
 
12 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Global Warfare and Long Term Economic Development, 1789-1939,’ 
in War in History, 3 (1996) pp. 437-50. 
13 Recently published textbooks devote very few pages to the analysis of connexions 
between warfare and British industrialization despite the fact that they proceeded in 
tandem. Vide P. Hudson, The Industrial revolution (London, 1992); M. Daunton,  
Progress and Poverty. An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1700-1850 (Oxford, 
1995); R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Modern 
Britain, vol. 1 Industrialization 1700-1860 (Cambridge, 2004) and R.C. Allen, The 
British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge, 2009); J. Mokyr, The 
Enlightened Economy. An Economic History of Britain (London, 2009). 
14 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power, War, Money and the English State 1683-1783 
(London, 1989); L. Stone (ed.), An Imperial State of War  (London, 1994) ; H. Bowen, 
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Ashton offered an acute analysis of the influences of warfare on 
economic fluctuations during the 18th century;  but he rejected John’s 
suggestions that expenditures by the army and navy on weapons, ships 
and equipment promoted any kind of significant stimulus for industrial 
production and technological innovation before 1760.15 Jones, Conway 
and Crouzet have all published excellent books and articles, tracing the 
impact of wars on sectors of the British economy (particularly trade and 
shipping) during the course of three major periods of warfare: 1689-1713, 
1776-83 and 1803-15.16 Anglo-Dutch rivalry and mercantile conflicts has 
attracted scholarship of the highest quality from Israel, Ormrod, and De 
Vries and Van der Woude.17 There is very little published on economic 
outcomes imputable to the War of Austrian Succession, 1739-48, the 
watershed Seven Years War of  1756-63 or those relatively minor 
conflicts with Sweden and Spain in the 1720s, 1770s and 1780s.18  
Although the bibliography in international history includes substantial 
volumes of evidence and many pertinent insights, the concerns of most 
historians are basically with the immediate problems and shorter term 
effects flowing from: the mobilization of resources; from victories, defeats, 
taxes, loans and monetary policies that operated while conflicts were in 
progress; supplemented by ad hoc assessments of the territorial losses 
 
War and British Society, 1688-1815 (Cambridge, 1998); S. Conway, The British Isles 
and the War of American Independence (Oxford, 2000). 
15 T.S. Ashton  Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800 (Oxford, 1959) and A. 
John, ‘War and the English Economy, 1700-1763,’ in Economic History Review, 7 
(1955), pp. 329-44. 
16 D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford, 
1989); Conway, The British Isles and the American War of Independence; S. Conway, 
War, State and Society in mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 2006); F. 
Crouzet, L’Economie Britannique et Le Blocus Continental (2nd ed., Paris, 1987) 
17 J. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford, 1989); J. De Vries and 
A. Van Der Woude, The First Modern Economy. Success, Failure and Perseverance of 
the Dutch Economy 1500-1815  (Cambridge, 1997); D. Ormrod, The Rise of 
Commercial Empires. England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650-
1770 (Cambridge, 2003); P. K. O’Brien, ‘Mercantilsm and Imperialism and the Rise and 
Decline of the Dutch and British Economies’, in De Economist, 148 (2000), pp. 148-
501. 
18 Bowen, War and British Society. 
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incurred or gains that accrued from peace treaties concluded at the end 
of wars.19 
Economic historians continue to adopt  more structuralist and 
comparative approaches by exploring multiple examples of mobilization 
for warfare by several European polities and their connexions to the 
formation of institutions and organizations – primarily and in the first 
instance to service their geopolitical policies, but which over time 
contributed to the establishment of comparative advantages including  
formation of more efficient centralized (“Weberian”) states, evolving to 
protect and sustain institutions that promoted the development of national 
interests. This style of research recognizes the inseparable connexions 
between warfare, state formation, competitive advantages and the 
construction of favourable and/or restrictive institutions for long term 
growth.20 
For example, several of the institutions established for defence and 
internal order by England’s republican regime during and in the wake of 
the Civil War ( including a greatly enlarged standing navy, the taxation of 
domestic production by way of excise duties and a reformulated strategy 
for the implementation of navigation acts) embodied long term spinoffs 
and externalities for private capital formation and innovation in domestic 
agriculture and industry, as well as the Island’s trade, shipping, 
commercial services and colonization overseas. The political consensus 
and organizational capacities that sustained Britain’s well funded fiscal 
 
19 Typified by the scholarship displayed in the writings and volumes edited by Philippe 
Contamine and Jeremy Black. Vide J. Black, (ed.), European Warfare, 1453-1815  
(Basingstoke, 1999), and P. Contamine (ed.),  War and Competition Between States 
(Oxford, 2000). For economic history the tradition, represented in seminal books by R. 
Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (London, 1962) and C. Wilson, 
England’s Apprenticeship, has not attracted new research in recent years. 
20 Surveyed and fully referenced in two recent volumes: L. Prados de la Escosura, 
Exceptionalism and Industrialization. Britain and its European Rivals, 1688-1815 
(Cambridge, 2004) and R. Torres Sanchez, War, State and Development. Fiscal 
Military States in the Eighteenth Century (Pamploma, 2007). 
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naval state  emerged during an interregnum of republican rule and the 
restoration of monarchy. Thereafter it evolved over time to supply several 
public goods of real significance for businessmen operating in the home 
economy and supported  investment  overseas. By increasing control 
over a  unifying kingdom, the state provided firms with:  external security 
against invasion, internal stability, the rigorous enforcement of private 
property rights, a bellicose foreign policy to sustain support for the 
maintenance of  an ideology of xenophobia, supporting cultures of 
deference to hierarchy and, above all, compliance with the taxation 
allocated for  naval (and military) protection for expansion overseas. 21 
As the level, scope and stability of tax revenues accruing to the 
restored monarchical regime increased, Britain’s ruling aristocratic elite 
became steadily more confident the state could fund (basically through 
the medium of debt accumulation), more aggressive geopolitical and 
mercantilist policies against the country’s economic rivals: the  
Netherlands, Spain, Scandinavia and Russia and above all France, for 
the gains from trade and colonization at a time of geo-political extension 
to and accelerated expansion in world commerce. By the  Seven Years 
War, 1756-63, the realm’s aristocratic and plutocratic elites had 
consolidated a political consensus, behind Britain’s fiscal and financial 
systems, invested heavily in naval power to defend the realm, 
commanded a military apparatus to deter serious challenges to property 
and could rely upon a culture of nationalism and deference to hierarchy 
required to sustain drives for  expansion overseas and become Europe’s 
hegemonic power.22 
 
21 P.K. O’Brien, ‘State Formation and the Construction of Institutions for the First 
Industrial Nation,’ in H.J. Chang (ed.), Institutional Change and Economic Development 
(New York, 2007), pp. 177-98. 
22 This argument is elaborated and referenced in a forthcoming survey and speculation 
for the Economic History Review. Vide P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Nature and Historical 
Evolution of an Exceptional Fiscal State and its Possible Significance for the 
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Although the American rebellion, which developed into open 
conflict with other European powers,  was an avoidable and expensive 
setback, the British state and its mercantilist strategy for growth, after the 
Peace of Paris (1783) slow recovery occurred  and the king and 
Parliament simply gave up on their pretensions to tax and regulate the 
economic affairs of “subjects” living and working 3000 miles from 
London.23 
Commerce with the Americas then resumed.24 Pitt the Younger and 
his able advisers began to reform and reorganize the Island state’s fiscal 
and financial system in order to regain the realm’s geopolitical and 
commercial lead over rivals from the mainland.25 The economy appears 
to have been back on track when Britain’s  unreformed system of  
parliamentary government and its propertied elites were confronted by the 
most sustained and expensive challenge to the political security, stability 
and economic prosperity of the Isles since the attacks by Spanish 
armadas in the late 16th century.26 
 
 
 
 
 
Precocious Commercialization and Industrialization of the British Economy from, 
Cromwell to Nelson (forthcoming Economic History Review, 2011). 
23 S. Conway, The War of American Independence, 1775-83 (London, 1995); H.T. 
Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the American revolution (London, 1998). 
24 R.C. Nash, ‘The Organization of Trade and Finance in  the British Atlantic Economy,’ 
in P.A. Coclonis (ed.), The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries (Columbia, South Carolina, 2005), pp. 95-152; N.F. Koehn, The Power of 
Commerce, Economy and Governance in the First British Empire (Ithaca, 1994);P.K. 
Liss, Atlantic Empires: the Networks of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826 (Princeton, 
1983). 
25 J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt. The Years of Acclaim (London, 1969) and R. Rayment, 
‘The Income and Expenditure of Great Britain of the last Seven Years’ (London, 1791: 
Goldsmiths’ Collection, University of London Library). 
26 H.D. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution (London, 1989) and Harvey, 
Collision of Empires. 
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3.  Fiscal and Financial Costs of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815 
The appropriation of revenues (taxes with loans) to fund the real 
resources (manpower, equipment, weapons, horses, foodstuffs, buildings, 
ships, fortifications, organizational systems etc . etc. utilized for the wars 
of 1793-1815 replicated the range of governmental tasks involved in the 
mobilization of armed force for previous conflicts going back to that 
protracted period of warfare against Louis XIV  and his allies from 1689-
1713. Nevertheless, the length, scale and scope of the effort required to 
raise sufficient taxes and loans to acquire the volume of resources 
allocated to defeat Revolutionary and Napoleonic France exceeded by a 
long way anything undertaken by the state since its takeover by William of  
Orange in 1688.  For example, between 1788-92, immediately before the 
Revolutionary War, George III and his ministers allocated about £7 million 
per annum to provide for the defence of the realm and civil administration 
(excluding transfer payments for debt servicing). At the close of the 
Napoleonic war (1803-15), expenditures on military and naval forces for 
an expanded empire and an inflated wartime administration had multiplied 
five times in real terms and had gone up from around 6% to above 22% of 
Britain’s national income. 
As Table 1 shows the tax “burdens” per head of the population had 
multiplied about seven times compared to amounts appropriated by 
William III to fund his newly acquired kingdom’s re-engagement with 
European power politics during the War of the League of Augsburg 
(1689-97) and by a far larger multiplier if comparisons are made with 
those years of peace under the last Stuart monarch, James II. In short, by 
any historical, international (or even Dutch)  standards, the taxation 
carried by British society and the economy to service debt and mobilize 
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resources to defeat the ambitions of Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France looks extraordinary.27 
 
Table 1: Burdens of Tax Revenues in Wartime 
 
War Period 
(5-year average) 
Taxation per Head in 
Constant Prices 
Taxes collected as Shares 
of National Income 
   
1693-97 100 6.7% 
1703-12 158 9.1% 
1743-47 189 8.7% 
1758-62 236 11.5% 
1778-82 277 11.7% 
1812-15 679 18.2% 
 
 
The aim here is to say something potentially viable, or at least 
worth contesting about the impact of this particular war upon the long-run 
growth of the economy. Since  “loops of inter-connexions” ran both ways, 
let us begin by degrading the hypothesis (prevalent in history textbooks) 
that the structural changes and rapid growth of the economy during the 
years 1793-1815 provided the state with some “substantial” share of the 
extra taxes and ergo the means for servicing debt and funding the 
resources allocated to the navy, to British and to foreign armies. 
Agreed: the rise of new industries, the concentration of production 
in factories, its agglomeration in towns and the increased pressures to 
comply with intensified and more effectively monitored demands for taxes 
in a war against a revolutionary foe and allocated for the defence of 
                                                            
27 The data sources for taxation used here are fully referenced in previous publications. 
P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British Taxation 1660-1815,’ in Economic 
History Review, 41 (1988) pp. 1-32 and in P.K. O’Brien and P. Hunt, ‘England,’ in R. 
Bonney (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c. 1200-1815 (Oxford, 1999). The 
reference to Dutch levels is to comparisons made by W. Fritschy, ‘Taxation in Britain, 
France and the Netherlands,’ in Economic and Social History of the Netherlands, 2 
(1990) pp. 57-99. 
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property and English “freedom” all helped the kingdom’s well developed 
fiscal and financial systems to appropriate revenue and borrow money 
more efficiently than ever before. Nevertheless, four quantified 
conclusions undermine any simplistic view that economic growth and 
structural change provided the state with a significant proportion of the 
extra taxation allocated to service loans to fund the resources required to 
defeat France.  
For example, less than 10% of the incremental taxation allocated to 
wage this war emanated from additions to the volumes of goods, services 
and incomes taxed before its outbreak in 1793. 55% came from raising 
rates of taxation levied on goods, services, wealth and incomes already 
taxed between 1788-92. Taxes introduced in wartime, especially the 
income tax (imposed in 1799), provided the state with 36% of the 
additional taxation required to defeat the bid by France for hegemony 
over Europe. Most of these “new taxes” did not, moreover, fall either 
directly or severely upon industries and sectors of the economy 
undergoing the kind of rapid growth, structural change and urban 
agglomeration associated with the First Industrial Revolution. For 
example, cotton textiles, the iron and metallurgical industries, coal,  
internal transportation by canals, shipbuilding and shipping as well as 
exports of manufactured goods continued to enjoy roughly the same kind 
of favourable fiscal treatment long advocated by mercantilists for new 
industries and for foreign trade and shipping - by then receiving heavier 
protection from the Royal Navy to cope with intensified dangers at sea.28 
Finally, the view that economic growth and structural change 
proceeding more slowly between 1793-1815 could have supplied 
anything more than a fraction of the resources required for warfare looks 
 
28 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Taxation for the Wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 
1793-1915,’ in C. Storrs (ed.), The Fiscal Military State in Eighteenth Century Europe 
(Farnham, 2009), pp. 167-201. 
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highly implausible because it implies inconceivable rates of expansion for 
the national income and its component fiscal base. Over these years of 
warfare expenditures by the state increased at an annual average rate of 
nearly 5% at a time when (according to Crafts) the estimated growth rate 
for gross domestic product decelerated to 1.5% per annum.29 
Unless the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to changes in  
national income was more than an inconceivable coefficient of 3.3, the 
data in Table 1 seems to support the orthodox inference that wars against 
France imposed steep and rising burdens associated with taxation and 
state borrowing on the domestic economy and British society both during 
the conflict and for several decades after final victories at Trafalgar and 
Waterloo.30 
Nevertheless, the numbers also suggest that the First Industrial 
Revolution continued (vide the indices calibrated by Deane, Cole, Crafts, 
Cuenca-Esteban and others) on an established trajectory, but the rate 
and pattern of  industrialization never transformed the national economy 
or extended its fiscal base at a pace anywhere near fast enough to carry 
more than a small share of the costs of this most expensive of conflicts. 
Given that invasion and defeat by the armies of Napoleon could 
conceivably have set back the Industrial Revolution for decades, the 
search for connexions is best conducted by specifying and, if possible,  
marshalling  evidence to answer two counterfactual questions that cannot 
be dismissed as anachronistic exercises in theoretical speculation? 
 
29 N.F.R. Crafts and K. Harley, ‘Output  Growth and the British Industrial Revolution: A 
Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View,’ in Economic History Review, 45 (`1992) pp. 
703-30 and K. Harley, ‘Reassessing the Industrial Revolution: a Macro View in J. 
Mokyr (ed.), The British Industrial Revolution (Boulder, 1993) pp. 160-205. The debate 
about resources to carry on with the war against France was a dominant discourse of 
the times. See J.E. Cookson, ‘Political Arithmetic and War in Britain,’ in War and 
Society (1983) pp. 37-60. 
30 J.E. Cookson, ‘British Society and the French Wars, 1793-1815,’ in Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 31 (1985) pp. 74-88 and C. Emsley, British Society and 
the French Wars (Totawa, 1984). The aftermath of the wars has been well covered by 
historians referenced in footnote 47 and in Hilton’s text cited below in fn. 31. 
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world?32 
                                                           
Firstly, why did this “re/misallocation” of resources  to support 23 years of 
warfare fail to depress the growth and structural change of the economy 
even further below levels that might well have been anticipated if trends in 
investment, towards diversification and of technological innovation 
(discernible and visible during the decade of peace that followed the 
Treaty of Paris in 1783) had continued into the 19th century? In other 
words, why was the momentum already transforming the economy from 
the 1760s onwards not held in check for far longer and more seriously by 
this costly war?31  Secondly (and this is a key argument for reviving an 
old discussion) what, if anything, could be claimed for positive legacies 
and spin-offs from mobilization for war that contributed to recovery and 
placed the economy back onto a course that led to the long Victorian 
boom and to Britain’s interlude of hegemony as the commercial hub and
industrial workshop of the 
Fiscal and financial accounts provide the most accessible and most 
frequently used bodies of data for historians who attempt to analyse and 
elaborate upon economic costs inflicted by warfare. But they bias 
investigations towards the measurable, neglect real or opportunity costs 
and divert attention away from any serious consideration of material 
benefits that flowed from money efficiently  spent by states. Furthermore, 
budgetary accounts are reported in current prices for a period when 
extraordinary fluctuations from year to year renders deflation to real terms 
highly problematical.33 In short, while these accounts promote 
 
31 This is virtually the way the question has been posed by England’s most 
distinguished historian of this period. Vide: Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad and Dangerous 
People. England 1783-1846 (New Oxford History of England, Oxford, 2006). Hilton 
provides an excellent survey of the social and political problems of the post war period 
attributable to twenty-three years of engagement in warfare. 
32 As celebrated in recent books by  Allen, The British Industrial Revolution; Mokyr, 
Industrial Enlightenment and by P. Vries, Via Peking back to China: Britain, the 
Industrial revolution and China (Leiden, 2003).  
33 J.T. Salerno, ‘War and the Money Machine: Concealing the Costs of War Beneath 
the Veil of Inflation,’ in Journal des Economists, 1 (1995), pp 153-73. For the French 
wars see the classic paper by J. Mokyr and N. Savin, ‘Stagflation in Historical 
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quantification, historical scholarship  could now move on from liberal 
antipathies to unavoidable wars and  concentrate upon the nature, 
significance, transformations and potential benefits as well as the 
opportunity costs of the resources mobilized by Britain and other early 
modern states for warfare.34  The resources, reallocated from civilian 
production, included manpower, capital, natural endowments and the 
skills and funds diverted from research and development for more 
efficient technologies and their diffusion across the private sector in order 
to produce weapons and other inputs utilized primarily for warfare. Apart 
from the long term benefits imputable to victory rather than defeat, 
engagement in warfare carried in its train positive outcomes for the 
accumulation of human and physical capital for the diffusion of 
technologies and, perhaps above all, for the enhancement of a nation’s 
competitive advantages for trade and commerce overseas. 
 
 
4. Labour 
Ostensibly the most significant of the factors of production 
reallocated from employment in the private economy either to serve in or, 
indirectly to provide goods and services for the forces of the Crown was 
manpower. According to annual budgetary estimates published for the 
period 1793-1815, a modal 60% of the revenues “voted” by parliament for 
the support of the armed forces (army, navy, militias, volunteers and 
 
Perspective: the Napoleonic Wars Revisited,’ in P. Uselding (ed.), Research in 
Economic History, 1 (1976), pp. 198-259.  Modern economists who properly prefer to 
deal with real or constant prices should remain aware that indices to measure anything 
other than grain prices were not available to contemporaries at the time. Vide A. 
Young, An Inquiry into the Increases in Prices in Europe during the Past Twenty-five 
Years  (Goldsmiths Collection, London, 1815) and T. Tooke, Thoughts and Details on 
Prices (Goldsmiths Collection, London 1824). 
34 In this and other respects the article by G. Hueckel, ‘War and the British Economy, 
1793-1815: a General Equilibrium Analysis,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 10 
(1973) pp. 365-96  promises more than it delivers. 
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ordnance) was classified as “pay and provisions”: which translates into 
“labour” and “subsistence”. By the latter years of the Napoleonic war, 
Parliament voted to pay and feed military, naval and ordnance forces in 
excess of half a million men compared to some 75,000 in 1792. 35 This far 
larger force under arms  included Irishmen, foreigners, volunteers, 
yeomanry and militias (embodied for only part of a year). Parliamentary 
“votes” can be transformed into “conjectures” that “outerbound estimates 
for the shares of British workforce recruited to serve in the forces of the 
crown during the French wars were at the very most 6% for the total 
labour force and 11% of males in their prime years. 36 These calculations 
make no allowance for troops and sailors recruited from Ireland who 
(according to Fortescue and Glover and Chart) constituted “significant” 
proportions of the British Army.37  Alas no estimates have been 
constructed for the increased numbers of workers engaged in  
maintaining, servicing and building ships, producing commodities,  
weapons, equipment, munitions, transportation, buildings, shelter etc and 
 
35 To clarify and classify the numbers of men mobilized for full and part-time service in 
the forces of the crown and the sum spent by the state on their pay and food would 
require years of research among several bodies of disparate and opaque records for 
audited public expenditures. The imperfect data cited here refer to: budgetary 
estimates produced for parliament (including “extraordinary” expenditures sanctioned 
after they had been incurred). They were published annually in appendices to Journals 
of the House of Commons and Supply Ledgers of the Treasury (Public Record Office 
Series T/35). They are printed in consolidated form in the British Parliamentary Papers 
1868-69 (35) and 1858 (17). The categories of manpower recruited and paid for military 
service to the state are discussed in C.M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (London, 
1869). 
36 I made a calculation for the census year 1801 designed to provide a quantified upper 
bound notion of the possible shares of the British male workforce reallocated from 
normal civilian employment into production for the navy, army, ordnance, militia, 
volunteers, fencibles etc. After making due allowance for the scale of the pre-war 
armed services, for part-time soldiers and foreign mercenaries, I concluded that the 
numbers involved could not have been more than 60% of the totals referenced in 
estimates put before Parliament for budgetary support – a total equal to around 11% of 
male workers in their prime years: and around 6% of the entire male workforce. 
37 J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London, 1910), pp. 94-96; R. Glover, 
Britain at Bay (London, 1973) , p. 131 and R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation. The 
Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809  (Cambridge, 1963) p. 225, and D.A. Chart, 
‘Irish Levies’, English Historical Review, 26 (1911) pp. 102-32. 
  
18
                                                           
the organized services purchased for the army and navy. We might 
plausibly assume that the additional demands by the state for “civilian” 
labour generated by engagement in warfare could have been 
approximately proportional to the shares of the incremental expenditures 
required to enlarge the armies and navies in the pay of the Crown 
between 1793 -1815.  On this premise my tentative estimate suggested 
that less than 18% of all male British workers in their prime (aged 15-40) 
ever became either directly or indirectly employed in the workforce 
involved with warfare. That ratio may exaggerate the redeployment of 
labour because Parliament’s parsimony towards the payment of wages to 
the kingdom’s soldiers and sailors combined with the operation of a 
selective system for conscription (Quota Acts) encouraged more affluent 
males to bribe and purchase their way out of military service. 38 The 
histories of mobilization for the armed forces are marked by a consensus 
that both the  Army and the Navy (which relied upon coercion to bring 
ships crews up to strength) recruited, conscripted and impressed 
manpower mainly from the lower ends of pay and skill categories.39 
Apart from the merchant marine and shipbuilding industry,  the 
civilian economy may not, moreover,  have been seriously deprived of its 
skilled and productive labour. Given that a modal percentage of 60% 
recruits  cited labourer as their occupation, the army may, as Malthus and 
Ricardo suggested, have enlisted a not insignificant percentage of the 
 
38    J.E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815 (Oxford, 1997). 
39 The range of measures passed by Parliament during the war to recruit, incentivize, 
cajole and coerce young males to serve in the forces of the crown (army, navy, 
volunteers, militias, fencibles) have been elaborated in detail in books  in fns 37 and 38 
Cookson,  British and Armed in Nation; C. Emsley, British Society and the French 
Wars,  and J. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1965),as 
well as in classical studies by J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army; Fortescue, 
The County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-14 (London, 1909); Clode,  Military 
Forces of the Crown, 2 vols (1869). Naval recruitment and impressment is covered in 
books by M. Lewis, A Social History of the Navy (London, 1960); C. Lloyd, The British 
Seaman 1200-1860 (London, 1968) and N. Rodger, Command of the Ocean. A Naval 
History of Britain, 1649-1815, vol. 2 (London, 2004). 
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nations potentially under or unemployed workers.40 While  the 
coincidence of the wars with sharp upswings in population growth and 
expenditures on poor relief are consistent with suggestions that some 
kind of “military Keynesianism”  may have been in operation over these 
years when (until the closing years of the war) wage rates for a majority of 
workers lagged behind prices.41  Although pay differentials between 
skilled and unskilled workers narrowed a little in wartime, the evidence for 
constraints on growth associated with inelastic supplies of labour is 
neither compelling nor consistent with conditions in the labour market for 
years after the war.42 On the contrary, and in so far as Britain entered and 
remained at war with an elastic supply of potentially underemployed 
labour, remunerated its troops and sailors at low rates of pay, coupled 
with subsistence, and maintained repressive controls over all forms of 
collective bargaining by workers, then overall the opportunity costs of 
 
40 Public Record Office, War Office Papers, volumes 25 and 69 give trades and place 
of birth of recruits to the army; C. Emsley, ‘North Riding Naval Recruits,’ in North 
Yorkshire County Record Office, 18 (1978), pp. 8-13; T.H. McGuffie, ‘Recruiting for the 
Ranks of the Regular British Army,’ in Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 34 (1956) pp. 56, 126 and 138. 
41 W.A. Armstrong, ‘The Influence of Demographic Factors on the Position of 
Agricultural Labour in England and Wales, c. 1750-1914,’ in Agricultural History 
Review, 29 (1981), pp. 68-81; Mokyr and Savin, ‘Stagflation in Historical Perspective’, 
criticize the full employment assumptions made in two papers by G. Hueckel, ‘The 
Napoleonic Wars and their Impact on Factor Returns and Output Growth in England, 
1793-1815,’ in Economic History Review, 33 (1973) and ‘War and the British 
Economy.’ 
42 The improbable full employment assumption is, however, the subject of dispute 
between G. Hueckel (cited in fn 41) and J. Anderson, ‘Aspects of the Effect on the 
British Economy of the Wars Against France,’ in Australian Economic History Review, 
12 (1972), pp. 1-18 and ‘A Measure of the Effect of British Public Finance, 1793-1815,’ 
in Economic History Review, 27 (1974), pp. 610-19. Feinstein’s indices for real 
“earnings index adjusted for unemployment” and for full employment show no tendency 
to rise between 1788-92 and 1813-17 – C. Feinstein, ‘Pessimism Perpetuated: Real 
wages and he standard of living in Britain during and after the Industrial Revolution,’  in 
Journal of Economic History, 58 (1998), pp. 648-653.  In current prices expenditures on 
the poor in England and Wales rose from just over £2 million per annum in 1783-85 to 
£6.3 million in 1814. Data from Parliamentary (Parliamentary Papers 1818 (41) app. 2) 
as being in receipt of “occasional” and “permanent” poor relief are neither concise nor 
reliable, but they suggest totals in excess of those on payrolls for the armed forces – 
see K. Williams, From Pauperism to Poverty (London, 1981). 
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mobilizing labour for warfare might have been on the scale of marginal 
economic significance.43 
Furthermore,  the evidence also suggests that the casualties 
suffered by the unfortunate victims of  armed conflict cannot be 
represented as a serious depletion of the stock of human capital available 
for the long run development of the British economy. Estimates for the 
economic effects of casualties are almost impossible to construct 
because proper allowance must be made for normal (civilian) rates for 
death and injury.44 While conjectures for “offsets” including the intangible 
gains derived from the inculcation of skills and attitudes to disciplined 
work that supposedly came from service aboard naval ships and in the 
colours as well as through the upsurge of patriotism that helped to 
consolidate hierarchical and managerial controls over the nation’s 
workforce, also need to be included in this page of any balance sheet.45 
To guess at some number or ratio that might represent the net 
depletion and depreciation of the nation’s stock of human capital 
imputable to 23 years of warfare would be a spurious, not to say a crass 
form of quantification. Given the numbers and credentials of most of the 
men conscripted for early modern conflicts, both the short term impact of 
mobilization and longer term economic significance of casualties from 
these final wars against France were probably a lot smaller than they 
 
43 This view is congruent with the views of economists of the day including Ricardo and 
Mathus. And see G. Chalmers, Historical View of the Domestic Economy of Britain and 
Ireland (Goldsmiths Collection, London 1812); J. Lowe, The Present State of England 
(Goldsmiths Collection, London, 1822) and T. Tooke, Thoughts and Details on Prices; 
Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793-1815.. 
44 G. Hodge, ‘On the Mortality Arising from Naval Operations,’ in Journal of the 
Statistical Society, 18 (1855) pp. 208-12 and ‘On the Mortality Arising from Military 
Operations,’ in Journal of the Statistical Society, 19 (1856) pp. 264-66. 
45 R. Price, British Society 1680-1880 (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 30-35; Cookson, British 
Armed Nation, 1793-1815; A. Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, 1794-1814 
(Oxford, 2003); H. T. Dickinson, ‘Popular Conservatism and Military Loyalism, 1785-
1815,’ in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution (Basingstoke, 1989) 
and G. Russell, The Theatres of War. Performance, Politics and Society (Oxford, 
1995); L.G. White, The Story of Army Education (London, 1963). 
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were compared to losses from the world wars of the 20th century.46 There 
is, moreover, nothing in discussions of post-war conditions in the labour 
market to suggest that the economy suffered from inelastic labour 
supplies between 1793 and 1815, or that the conflict had seriously 
depleted on Britain’s stock of human capital. 47 That situation may not 
have been obtained in France, Spain and other belligerent rivals and 
competitors on the mainland. They suffered far more casualties than the 
United Kingdom. 
 
 
5. The Connexions of War to the Formation, Depreciation, 
Destruction, Appropriation and Augmentation  of the Stock of 
National Capital 
Feinstein’s estimated that stocks of fixed and circulating capital 
available for private production may have increased by 27% (around 
1.0% per annum) between 1792 and 1816.48 How rapidly that stock might 
have accumulated in the absence of war seems very difficult to measure. 
Yet in recent years this potentially major, connexion between the 
Industrial Revolution and the long wars against Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic France stimulated an interesting debate among economic 
historians, inspired by theoretical propositions designed by neo-classical 
 
46 J. Greenwood, ‘British Loss of Life in the Wars, 1793-1815 and 1914-18,’ in Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society, 105 (1942), pp. 4-7; S. Broadberry and P. Howlett, 
‘Economic Mobilization for World War II: The United Kingdom’ (unpublished paper, 
September 1995); S. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.), The Economics of World War 
I (Cambridge, 1995). 
47 A.W. Acworth, Financial Reconstruction in England, 1815-22 (London, 1925); B. 
Gordon, Political Economy in Parliament, 1819-23,’ (New York, 1976); B. Gordon, 
Economic Doctrine and Tory Liberalism, 1824-30 (London, 1979); B. Hilton, Corn, 
Cash and Commerce (Oxford, 1977) and A. Gambles, The Boundaries of Political 
Economy. Tory Economic Arguments, 1809-47I (London, 1996); J. Clapham, ‘Europe 
after the Great Wars 1815 and 1920,’ in Economic Journal, 30 (1920), pp. 423-35. 
48 C. Feinstein, ‘Capital Accumulation in the Industrial Revolution,’ in R. Floud and D. 
McCloskey (eds.), The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, vol.1 (Cambridge, 
1981) pp. 128-42. 
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economic theorists, to demonstrate that borrowing by states to fund 
expenditures on their armed forces tends (under rigorously specified 
conditions) to “crowd out” private borrowing and investment undertaken 
for  ostensibly more productive purposes.49 Thus loans to the state which 
funded warfare against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France could have 
left the kingdom’s economy at the end of hostilities with a stock of 
physical capital depleted and depreciated some way below the level that 
it could counterfactually have been in a position to utilize if the state had 
not borrowed savings to sustain much larger armies in the field and 
navies at sea  over this  protracted period of conflict. Although the model 
looks plausible enough, it remains as a proposition of contention among 
competing theories that span the gambit of  possibilities from crowding 
out to crowding in.50 Thus, the empirical question of where the stock of 
British capital and prospects for its future accumulation might have stood 
in 1815 (after some twenty-five years of wartime conditions) continues to 
be difficult for historians of British and European economic history to 
specify, let alone measure.51 
Not least because after four years of heavy borrowing (1793-1797) 
Pitt the Younger and his successors at the Treasury departed from the 
kingdom’s traditional strategy by funding very high proportions of the 
resources mobilized to continue the struggle against France with taxes 
 
49 M. Boskin et al (eds.), Private Saving and Public Debt (Oxford, 1987). 
50 B. Friedman, ‘The Effects of Large Government Deficits on Interest Rates and Equity 
Returns,’ in Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1 (1984), pp. 58-71; M. Edelstein, 
‘What Price Cold War? Military Spending and Private Investment in the US, 1946-
1979,’ in Cambridge Journal of Economics, 14 (1990), pp. 421-37; R. Barro, 
‘Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices and Budget Deficits in the United 
Kingdom, 1701-1918,’ in Journal of Monetary Economics, 20 (1987), pp. 221-49. 
51 I rely on data reconstructions by C. Feinstein, ‘Capital Formation in Great Britain,’ in 
P. Mathias and M Postan (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe,, vol. VII 
(Cambridge, 1978), p. 66. Feinstein’s data can be converted to mid-decennial 
estimates for gross national expenditures on capital formations in current prices. They 
are: £10.3 million for 1785, £13.4million for 1790, £16.4million for 1795, £16.9million for 
1800, £18.9million for 1805, £27.9million for 1810, £37.9million for 1815 and 
£40.7million  for 1820. Feinstein’s original data was constructed in constant prices of 
1857-60. 
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instead of loans. Thereafter and by the end of this protracted interval of 
wartime public finance 58% of the money raised to secure victory had 
emanated from taxation compared to around 21% for four previous 
wars.52 Even so, the nominal value of the sums borrowed by selling 
perpetual annuities and other public securities on the London capital 
market do prima facie look like an enormous diversion of the nation’s 
savings away from investments for more productive purposes. This 
impression often arises, however, from citations of official figures which 
refer to the face values of the national debt serviced by the state which 
rose from a nominal total of £292 million (1788-92) to £862 million in 
1817.53 Apart from the impression conveyed by nominal values even 
when expressed as ratios of national income (another modern number 
unknown to contemporaries) the whole problem of “crowding out”  could 
be dismissed as anachronistic and malposed because ultimately the 
funds borrowed by the state were allocated to “crowd out” plans for 
invasion by French armies, and a conceivably far more serious check to 
economic transformation that could have followed from the occupation  of 
the United Kingdom by Napoleon’s army. Nevertheless, a counterfactual 
exercise for a First  Industrial Revolution, proceeding within an 
ontologically improbable peaceable geopolitical international economic 
order, could be heuristic to contemplate with reference to capital 
formation because some degree of crowding  almost certainly occurred, 
particularly in the short run. There are, however, no valid reasons to 
accept hypotheses that the elasticity of substitution between borrowing by 
the government and investment by the private sector could have been 
                                                            
52 O’Brien, ‘Taxation for the Wars Against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France’ 
53 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power with Profit. The 
Management of Britain’s National Debt, 1756-1815,’ in F.P. Caselli (ed.), Government, 
Debts and Financial Markets in Europe (London, 2008), pp. 179-208. Even though 
market prices were quoted for the range of paper assets representing government 
debt, it is not clear what meaning could be attached to a market value for the entire 
stock of any national debt? 
  
24
                                                           
close to unity?  It is not at all plausible to suggest that every million 
pounds subscribed  by domestic savers as loans of various maturities for 
the state or extended by suppliers to the army, navy, ordnance and other 
departments as credit would, ceteris paribus, have been invested in 
assets contributing to the growth and structural  transformation of Britain’s 
civilian economy?54 
Alas, the data required for a contextualized discussion of 
probabilities based upon some statistical evidence lacks a secure annual 
series for private investment expenditures upon fixed and circulating 
capital in current prices to compare with the net annual amounts of loans 
and credits extended to the state before, during  and in the immediate 
aftermath of warfare from 1793-1815.  Feinstein constructed national 
“best guess” totals for such expenditures which are cited in table 2 for 
purposes of comparison with estimates for net  inflows of funds (also in 
current prices) obtained by the state from a complex of recorded 
transactions with domestic and foreign capital markets involving the 
issue, redemption and repayment of perpetual, long and short term loans 
and credits as well as transfers for debt servicing. Feinstein warned us 
that the margins of error in his estimates range from 10% to 25%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 J.G. Williamson, ‘Why was British Growth so Slow during the Industrial Revolution?’ 
in Journal of economic History 44 (1987), pp. 687-712 and the subsequent debate in C. 
Heim and P. Mirowski, ‘Interest Rates and Crowding Out during Britain’s Industrial 
Revolution,’ in Journal of Economic History, 47 (1987), pp. 117-39 and J.G. Williamson, 
‘Debating the British Industrial Revolution,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 3 
(1987), pp. 269-92. 
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Table 2 : Estimates for Borrowing by the State and Conjectures for 
Private Expenditures on Capital Formation 1781-1820 (in current prices) 
 
Annual 
Averages 
£m 
Net Private 
Investment  
£m 
Net State 
Borrowing 
£m 
Nominal 
Yield on 
Consols 
% 
Interest 
Payments on 
Government 
Debt (£m) 
1781-90 10.7 Negligible 4.5 8.8 
1791-1800 22.4 20.2 4.7 10.9 
1801-1810 25.5 13.4 4.8 20.2 
1811-1820 36.7 12.5 4.6 28.3 
 
Notes and Sources:  Net private investment expenditures are from C. Feinstein, 
‘Capital accumulation and the industrial revolution’, in R. Floud and D. McCloskey 
(eds.) The Economic History of Britain since 1700 (Cambridge, 1981) p. 131. His 
figures have been reflated to current prices using price indices constructed by Rostow 
Gayer and Schwartz in B. Mitchell (ed.)  Abstract of Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 
1962), pp. 470-71 and by P.K. O’Brien, ‘Agriculture and the home market for British 
industry 1660-1820’, in English Historical Review, 100 (1985), pp. 773-79. The figures 
for net inflows of money borrowed by the state are taken from P.K. O’Brien’s  
unpublished D.Phil thesis, Government Revenue 1793-1815 (Oxford, 1967). Table 4 p. 
10. Recalculated interest charges on the loans are listed on p. 17 of that thesis. 
Nominal yield on consols is from C. Heim and P. Mirowski, ‘Interest Rates and 
Crowding out during Britain’s Industrial Revolution’, in Journal of Economic History, vol. 
XLVI (1987), p. 120. 
 
 
Figures for net annual government borrowing have not been 
reconstructed from the public accounts for the 1780s, but since the 
American war ended in 1782-83,  the net average annual amounts 
borrowed for the  inter-war period were probably negligible. Subsequently 
net borrowing by the state fluctuated over time and  peaked in the closing 
years of the Napoleonic war 1813-15 but then ceased. Figures for 1811-
20 refer to the years 1811-15 and are an outer-bound estimate for a 
decade when the operations of the sinking fund and demobilization from 
armed conflict led to a switch from net annual borrowing to repayments of 
public debt from 1816-20. 
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Although the table is a crude representation of the annual flows of 
savings, private investment, government loans and debt servicing 
operations for the period, it provides some kind of statistical basis for 
addressing the possible significance of crowding out. That hypothesis 
(even if it could be tested econometrically) could not, however, support 
hyperbolic claims that wars had (or indeed ever could be) “factored out of 
the industrial revolution”.55 The theory required to address such an unreal 
separation of the kingdom’s industrialization from its engagement in a 
sequence of mercantilist wars from 1651 onwards could only be infinitely 
more complex than an underspecified model for growth that concentrates 
on capital formation alone for a sub-period 1793-1815.56 
Yet warfare and its potential for “crowding out” does not prima facie 
look trivial. The sums borrowed by the state represented substantial, and 
in the early stages of the war, high ratios relative to total net investment in 
privately owned stocks of fixed and circulating capital. Nevertheless, other 
data particularly quotations for interest rates (both nominal and real) 
undermine the impression that the annual average sums borrowed by 
government to wage war could be interpreted as a really serious diversion 
 
55 Even if the model is reformulated to include rational expectations about movements 
in bond prices and interest rates – vide R.A. Black and C.G. Gilmore, ‘Crowding Out 
during Britain’s Industrial revolution,’ in Journal of Economic History, 50 (1990), pp. 
109-31 and G. Hueckel’s cliometric exercises to factor out war from the industrial 
revolution are not convincing. 
56  For the opposite view that this and presumably other wars could with help from 
econometrics be “factored out” see the articles cited in this paper by G. Hueckel and 
J.G. Williamson, ‘New Views on the Impact of the French Wars on Accumulation of 
Britain,’ in Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper 1480 (1990), pp. 
1-25. Other cliometricians are not convinced that the supply curve for investible funds 
had been a key constraint on British economic growth or that it remained inelastic to 
changes in the relative price levels, interest rates and to the institutional and political 
changes surrounding the domestic and international markets for capital during the 
French wars. Vide. N.F.C. Crafts, ‘British Economic Growth, 1700-1850. Some  
Difficulties of Interpretation ,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 24 (1987), pp. 245-
68 and J. Mokyr, ‘Has the Industrial Revolution been Crowded Out? Some Reflections 
on Crafts and Williamson,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 24 (1989), pp. 293-319. 
The connexions between warfare and industrialization are analysed in P.K. O’Brien, 
‘State Formation and the Construction of Institutions for the First Industrial Revolution.’ 
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of investible funds available for from capital formation by the private 
sector. Rates of interest referenced above as the nominal yield on 
consols rise by too small a percentage to support a strong hypothesis. 
Furthermore, these average yields on consols fall into line with rates of 
interest the Treasury had to offer contractors, in order to sell perpetual 
annuities to financial intermediaries operating on the London capital 
market between March 1793 (when the annual interest bill for a loan of 
£4.3 million amounted to 4.29%) and June 1815, when net receipts on the 
final loan of £35 million (to fund armies for the Battle of Waterloo) incurred 
annual interest payments at a rate of 5.79%. In between the modal rate 
fluctuated between 4.75% and 5.75% with peak rates of just over 6% 
during the months of crisis between April 1797 and April 1798.57 This 
data, together with a reading of day-to-day records of governmental 
transactions with the money market could not rule out some degree of  
crowding out or dismiss theoretically plausible connexions between public 
and private operations, that occurred in the context of an integrating but 
hardly an integrated national market for capital.58 But they do suggest 
that the properly specified and most interesting  question for historians
address is, as usual, the issue debated by contemporaries at the time; 
namely  why flows of funds made available for purposes of warfare and 
for the continued formation of capital in agriculture,  industry, commerce 
and the infrastructure, remained relatively elastic during a quarter of a 
century of discernibly elevated levels of demand for loans and credits by 
 
57 P.K. O’Brien, Government revenue, p. 17. These rates are ratios in current prices for 
the amounts received at the Exchequer and annual interest payments incurred to raise 
loans. The late John Wright of Trinity College, Oxford, clarified the meanings that could 
be attached to total returns on the range of government stocks traded on the London 
capital market in an unpublished paper, ‘Government Borrowing and the Interest Rate 
1750-1815’ (unpublished paper, Oxford, July, 1996). 
58 J.L. Buchinsky and B. Polak, ‘The Emergence of a National Capital Market in 
England,’ in Journal of Economic History, 53 (1993), pp. 1-24. 
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the British and also by other European states engaged in warfare?59 This 
question also bears upon the wider problem of the relative significance of 
constraints arising from propensities and capacities to save compared to 
propensities and opportunities to invest during the Industrial Revolution.60 
Although the majority of the physical indicators for investment for 
the years immediately before and during the war testify to something like 
a semblance of continuity in capital formation between 1793 and 1815, 
the  financial flow charts required to deal with the problem of domestic 
savings supplemented by inflows of foreign funds and expenditures on 
capital formation between 1793 and 1815 might never be constructed.61  
Several more or less plausible reasons can  be offered to account 
for the wartime paradox. For example, the spread and persistence of 
warfare across the mainland of Europe widened and deepened the 
transnational pool of investible funds (credits and loans) that became 
accessible to the British government.62 In contrast to all other European 
 
59 In real terms the net amounts borrowed fell from around £18 million per annum, 
1793-97 to £8 million, 1808-12, but were jacked up to £14 million for the final years of 
the Napoleonic War 1813-15 (see O’Brien, Government Revenue, tables 18-22). The 
contemporary debate  is surveyed by Cookson, ‘Political Arithmetic and War in Britain,’ 
and vide P. Colquhoun , ‘Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British 
Empire,’ (Goldsmiths Collection, University of London Library) and G. Chalmers, ‘An 
Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain, 1804,’ (Goldsmiths Collection, 
University of London Library) for views by contemporary economists that the economy 
could sustain warfare and growth at the same time. 
60 A question that has preoccupied Crafts (Crafts, ‘British Economic Growth, 1700-
1850) and Allen (R.C. Allen, ‘Capital Accumulation, Technological Change and the 
Distribution of Income during the Industrial Revolution (unpublished paper Nuffield 
College, Oxford, 2005). 
61 Physical and surrogate indicators for capital formation in print refer to: the production 
of bricks, white glass, pig iron, steam engines, ships, copper, tin, iron; factories erected 
for woollens, paper, imports of timber, bills passed for enclosures of land, river 
improvements, canal and road construction, houses charged to the window tax, 
numbers of banks, cotton spindles in operation, patents registered etc are tabulated in 
O’Brien, Government Revenue, table 36; A. Gayer et al, Growth and Fluctuations in the 
British Economy, 2 vols (Oxford, 1953) and S. Pollard and J.P. Higgins (eds.), Aspects 
of Capital Investment in Britain (London, 1971). 
62 G.J. Ellis, The Napoleonic Empire (London 1991); R.J. Black, ‘Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Warfare,’ in R. J. Black (ed.), European Warfare, 1453-1815 (Basingstoke, 
1999); K.J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and the International Order 
(Cambridge, 1991). 
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states  - and except perhaps momentarily in 1797 and 1805 – neither 
domestic nor foreign investors in the securities of the Island state could 
have rationally contemplated that the realm might be successfully invaded 
from the sea;  or that the government’s debt (with its traditionally secure 
and untaxed payments of interest) might be repudiated either as an 
outcome of conquest or as the result of any unmanageable fiscal and 
financial crisis of the state.63 Over 23 years of prolonged and widespread  
revolutionary warfare (when the external security and internal stability of 
almost all other European  empires, realms and republics either  
experienced or anticipated threats from French aggression and when 
property rights  of all kinds became extremely difficult for states to protect) 
the safest haven for mobile capital was located offshore. 
References to the flight of liquid capital (along with people with 
commercial expertise) to Britain are not difficult to cite. Bonds and bills 
issued as securities by the Government, or firms,  in London surely 
continued to provide European investors with marketable and less risky 
assets for their portfolios than anything available elsewhere including 
Paris. Alas, data for flows of capital emanating not only from the mainland 
but from the United States; from Britain’s expanding empire and 
conquests in the Caribbean, India, South East Asia and the unstable 
empires of Portugal and Spain in South America cannot be aggregated 
into an unambiguous and incontestable table of annual estimates of 
transfers of foreign and imperial funds into and out of  London during the 
 
63 This view has been developed by Neal in a seminal book on the international capital 
market and a series of articles on capital movements during the French wars is aligned 
with the perceptions of contemporary observers. Vide: L. Neal, The Rise of Financial 
capitalism (Cambridge, 1990); L. Neal, ‘A Tale of Two Revolutions, International 
Capital Flows, 1789-1819.’ In Bulletin of Economic Research, 43 (1991), pp. 307-37. 
Neal’s views are shared by Acworth, Financial Reconstruction in England. While Lord 
Grenville told Auckland : “the proposal of confiscating foreign property in the fund I hold 
in abhorrence”, Dropmore Papers 1892-1915, vol. 8, letter dated 2 December 1806. On 
the migration of European merchants into London, vide S. Chapman, Merchant 
Enterprise in Britain from the Industrial Revolution to World War 1 (Cambridge, 1992). 
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wars. Cuenca’s recently and constructed balance of payments accounts, 
Feinstein’s estimates and Wright’s research into overseas holdings in the 
national debt add up to an impression of gross but not necessarily 
substantial net inflows of savings from overseas.64 
Given that international markets for mobile capital had been 
integrating  for several decades before the outbreak of revolution in 
France and the strong historical evidence that during the wars with 
Revolutionary France, London became Europe’s most secure haven for 
capital and skills, the presumption that foreign savings helped (in some 
and perhaps significant measure) or at least mitigated the more adverse 
effects from crowding out remains plausible. After all, the French 
Revolution, particularly in its initial phases, represented a serious attack 
upon aristocratic and other forms of ancien regime, wealth and property 
rights.65 Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies threatened and/or actively 
disrupted the operations of capital markets in Amsterdam, Antwerp, 
Venice, Hamburg, Frankfurt and other European cities that before the 
Revolution had rivalled London as centres for dealings in financial 
assets.66 
At the same time positive if unintended offsets flowed from Pitt’s 
famous decision of 1797 to release the country’s monetary system from 
 
64 Cuenca-Esterban’s research which has superseded the controversial estimates from 
Brezis is cited at fn.152. Feinstein’s data is in P. Mathias and M. Postan (eds.), 
Cambridge Economic History of Europe , vol. 7, p. 66 and Wright’s unpublished 
research is cited in fn. 57 and by J. Wright, ‘The Contribution of Overseas Savings to 
the Funded National Debt of Great Britain,’ in Economic History Review, 50 (1999) pp. 
657-74. 
65  F. Crouzet, Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in Franco-British History 
(Cambridge, 1990). 
66 E. Aerts and F. Crouzet (eds.), Economic Effects if the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars (Leuven, 1990); P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Hanoverian State and the Defeat 
of the Continental System,’ in R. Findlay et al (eds.), in Eli Heckscher, International 
Trade and Economic History(Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 373-406; A. Milward and 
S.B. Saul, The Economic Development of Continental Europe 1780-1870 (London, 
1973), pp. 248-70; S. Schama, ‘The Exigencies of War and Politics of taxation in the 
Netherlands,’ in J.M. Winter (ed.), War and Economic Development (Cambridge, 
1975), pp. 103-38;  Harvey, Collision of Empires.  
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all constraints of convertibility associated with an 18th century version of 
the gold standard. 67 Assisted by the greater  flexibility introduced into the 
supply of paper money and credit, the kingdom’s financial intermediaries 
(merchants, metropolitan banks, insurance firms, mortgage companies, a 
reformed stock exchange and literally hundreds of newly founded 
provincial banks) extended their services and accessibility to include a 
range of hitherto riskier customers and securities for credits and loans as 
well as a wider array of assets which were, moreover, cushioned at the 
safer end of their portfolios by the bonds and bills of the Government 
bearing rates of interest some 30%-40% above normal pre-war levels and 
predicted to appreciate in value once victory was secured.68 
From 1797 to 1819 the flexibility afforded by the suspension of 
specie payments to transact with paper money, bank deposits and bills of 
exchange, as well as with the government’s own bills,  promoted the 
extension and integration of the market for money, stimulated financial 
intermediaries to take greater risks and encouraged those with liquid 
savings to invest, not only in government paper, but to participate in what 
moralists, conservatives and monetarists of the day condemned as 
 
67 The 18th century monetary system is described in classic texts by J. Clapham, 
History of the Bank of England, vol.1 (Cambridge, 1948); T.S. Ashton and R. Sayers 
(eds.), Papers in English Monetary History (Oxford, 1953) and L.S. Pressnell, Country 
Banking in the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1956).  M. Collins, Money and Banking in 
the United Kingdom updates those texts. The classic article on monetary regulation is 
by M.C. Lovell, ‘The Role of the Bank of England as a Lender of Last Resort in the 
Crises of the Eighteenth Century’, in Explorations in Economic History, 10 (1957), pp. 
8-21. 
68 The operations of the financial and monetary system under a regime of inconvertible 
paper, 1797-1819 has been covered by a prolonged and voluminous contemporary 
debate surveyed by E. Wood, Theories of Central Bank Control (Cambridge, Mass., 
1939); J. Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (London, 1955) and F.W. 
Fetter, The Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 
There is also an extensive modern literature in British monetary history the most recent 
publications with bibliographies are M. Bordo and  F. Capie (eds.), Monetary Regimes 
in Transition (Cambridge, 1994), and my forthcoming paper ‘Monetary Policy and its 
Critics: The British Experience with Inconvertible Currency, 1797-1819.’ (forthcoming 
2011). 
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“speculation”.69  Of course, the dangers of a monetary system freed from 
regulations of any kind, reliant upon the discretion of ministers of the 
crown, the caution of governors of the Bank of England and the prudence 
of bankers free to issue their own paper notes and credit  were cogently 
articulated at the time.70 During the famous bullion controversy of  1810-
11, Ricardo and his supporters castigated ministers (trying to run a war 
and to thwart Napoleon’s serious attempt to blockade European markets 
to British exports) for allowing the fragile paper pound to depreciate 
against gold and other hard currencies to the tune of 10%-15%.71  By that 
stage of the war, with inflation running at 3%, inconvertible paper money 
had indeed begun to display familiar dangers in the form of higher interest 
rates charged for loans and credits extended to the state and shortages 
of  funds for fixed investments in houses, buildings, social overhead 
capital and mortgages for agricultural improvements.72 Nevertheless, the 
hopes of Napoleon and his advisers for a collapse of the British fiscal and 
financial system and the comparably dire predictions of English bullionists 
never came to pass.73 At the height of French domination over Europe, 
despite inflation and a depreciated rate of exchange, the Hanoverian 
state continued to borrow at rates of interest below 5%. By then (1812-15) 
wages were probably just beginning to catch up with prices. For most of 
the war that involuntary transfer of income from labour to capital probably 
 
69 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Merchants and Bankers as Patriots or Speculators. Foreign 
Commerce and Monetary Policy in Wartime, 1793-1815,’ in J. McCusker and K. 
Morgan (eds.), The Early Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, 2000); R. Cameron et al (ed.), 
Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization (Oxford, 1967), chapters 1-3; L. Brunt, 
‘Country banks as venture capitalists,’ in Journal of Economic History, 1 (2001), pp. 74-
102. 
70 E. Cannan (ed.), The Paper Pound 1797-1821 (London, 1925) and F.W. Fetter, ‘The 
Politics of the Bullion report, ‘in Economica, 26 (1959), pp. 99-120. 
71 J. Silberling, ‘Financial and Monetary Policy in the Wars Against France,’ in Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 38 (1924), pp. 214-33. 
72 Mokyr and Savin , ‘Stagflatation in Historical Perspective.’ 
73 F. Crouzet, L’Economie britannique et le blocus continental, Harvey, Collision of 
Empires. 
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operated to stimulate savings and to cheapen construction and all labour 
intensive forms of capital formation.74 
In theory a floating pound detached from gold might, however, have 
checked the flight of capital from Napoleon’s extensive empire into 
London. But sterling was by no means the only currency to fluctuate in 
value when French armies rampaged across Europe.75 Meanwhile 
fluctuating rates probably encouraged foreign investors to retain sterling 
assets until the pound stabilized and the government kept to its repeated 
promise to return the monetary system to full convertibility at the 
traditional parity with gold.76 
Thirdly, over the years of conflict interest payments to service the 
mounting burden of debt (see Table 2) rose from about half the annual 
net amounts borrowed by the state to prosecute war against 
Revolutionary France (1793-1802) to reach about double the sums raised 
as loans in order to vanquish the Napoleonic empire between 1803-15. 
This  “regressive” political mechanism for transferring income from 
taxpayers to creditors (or from social groups with lower capacities to save 
and invest to those with higher propensities) had evolved steadily, war by 
war, since the Dutch coup d’état of 1688.77 It augmented a trend towards 
 
74 Runs of bad harvests, inflation and swings relative prices renders the task of 
constructing a representative trend for rates of change in real wages during a period of 
war very difficult. Vide N. Von Tunzelman, ‘Trends in Real Wages Revisited. 1750-
1850,’ in Economic History Review, 32 (1979), pp. 33-49. Feinstein’s widely accepted 
indices in ‘Pessimism Reunited,’ suggests that real earnings adjusted for 
unemployment did not regain 1788-92 levels before 1818-22. Crouzet surveys the data 
and plumps for a disaggregated representation. Vide F. Crouzet, ‘Guerre et Salaires de 
L’Angleterre 1793,’ in F. Crouzet (ed.), Melange d’histoire economique offerrs au 
Professeur Anne Marie Kinz (Geneve, 1989), pp. 71-85. 
75 Young, An Inquiry into the Increase in Prices in Europe; Neal’s point ‘Tale of Two 
Revolutions,’ that a potentially large share of European capital flowing into London 
went into shipping and commercial, services allied to trade and enjoyed protection from 
the Royal Navy, is supported by histories of London merchants. Vide the bibliography 
in K. Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and  the British Economy (Cambridge, 2000); 
Chapman, Merchant Enterprise and Liss, Atlantic Empires. 
76 O. Brien, ‘Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power with Profit.’ 
77 O’Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British Taxation’ and J. MacDonald, A Free Nation 
Deep in Debt. The Financial Roots of Democracy (New York, 2003). 
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increased inequality and contributed to social distress and internal 
disorder for some three decades in the wake of the final victory at 
Waterloo.78 While the wars against France continued the reinvestment 
mechanism built into the Hanoverian states fiscal and financial system 
maintained an elastic supply of loans and credits for a state engaged in 
warfare to protect the political privileges and rights of property, including 
the assets of bondholders - who could in any case confidently anticipate a 
significant uplift in the value of their securities once the end of any war 
terminated the need to run budgetary deficits and when the operations of 
Pitt’s constitutionally safeguarded sinking fund would resume operations 
designed to redeem the entire public debt.79 
To sum up:  some crowding out inevitably occurred during this most 
protracted and costly of mercantilist wars, but several factors operated to 
weaken its potentially serious obstruction to Britain’s trajectory towards an 
industrial economy. Firstly, Pitt’s suspension of convertibility created 
conditions of flexibility for an unusual increase in the money supply that 
allowed for the widening, deepening and integration of financial 
intermediation without running into a really serious danger of fiscal and 
financial collapse while promoting a lag of wages behind rising prices. 
Secondly, the nature and extent of warfare on the mainland, initiated and 
sustained by France, together with the extensions to the formal and 
informal British empire overseas promoted movements of foreign  capital 
 
78 N. Gash, ‘After Waterloo: British Society and the Legacy of the Napoleonic Wars,’ in 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 28 (1978), pp. 145-57; M. C. Buer, ‘Trade 
Depression Following the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Economica, 2 (1921), pp. 159-79 and 
Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce and other books cited in fn 47. 
79 O’Brien, ‘Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power and Profit’; Wright, 
‘Government Borrowing and Interest Rate’. J.G. Williamson, Did British Capitalism 
Breed Inequality? (London, 1985). Ch. 4 surveys and calibrates the rather restricted 
evidence available from tax data and contemporary estimates to address this issue and 
vide: Allen, ‘Capital Accumulation.’ Pitt funded the massive deficit for 1797 with what he 
termed a “loyalty loan” and published the names of patriots who contributed. On the 
fear of Revolution in England, vide: Dickinson, Britain and the French revolution; Gee, 
The British Volunteer Movement, and Hilton, A Bad and Dangerous People; Harvey, 
Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century. 
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into London. Thirdly, the bias already built  into the states’ fiscal and 
financial system (together with inconvertible paper money) intensified 
tendencies towards inequality in the distribution of income that promoted 
propensities to save and invest among a propertied and patriotic elite, 
whose political and economic stake in the kingdom was under threat from 
the armies of Revolutionary France.80  
Finally, and to complete a specimen balance sheet on capital 
account, it will be necessary to analyse and quantify not merely the 
incalculable costs of averting invasion and defeat but an offsetting list of 
long term gains derived from expenditures by the state on warfare that 
augmented the stock of  private and public capital available to contribute 
to the recovery and longer run growth of the British economy after 1815.81  
For example,  some of the surplus capital owned by the forces of the 
crown in 1815 (including ships, buildings, wagons, horses, stores etc) 
could be resold at bargain prices for civilian use at the end of the conflict. 
For several decades after final victory at Waterloo the state commanded 
a range of warships, weapons and skills held in reserve for the defence of 
the realm and empire, to support the kingdom’s foreign, strategic and 
commercial policies and an enlarged army of troops with equipment and 
barracks for the maintenance of internal order.82  Lord Liverpool’s and 
subsequent administrations controlled an intimidating fleet of battleships; 
 
80 This argument was elaborated by a long list of political arithmeticians whose writings 
and numbers on post-war wealth, power and resources of  Britain and its extended 
empire can be consulted in the Goldsmiths Collection at the Library of the University of 
London. Under the names of G. Chalmers, P. Colquhoun, J. Lowe, J. Marshall, C. 
Moreau, T. Vaux. These writings neglected by economic historians in thrall to classical 
economics have been surveyed and contextualized by historians including: Acworth, 
Financial Reconstruction; Hilton,  Corn, Cash and Commerce; Gambles, The 
Boundaries of Political Economy; Hilton, England 1783-1860. 
81 Stocks of military and naval capital are reviewed in the House of Commons Journal 
(1806), pp. 781-86 and Parliamentary Paper 1817 (4). For the navy see J. Coad, The 
Royal Dockyards, 1690-1850 (Aldershot, 1989). 
82 Acworth, Financial Reconstruction; Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce; S. Pollard 
and D.W. Crossley, The Wealth of Britain, 1095-1966 (London, 1968), ch. 6; S. 
Checkland, The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815-1885 (New York, 1964). 
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a trained supply of skilled seamen and soldiers; reserves of cannon, 
muskets, pistols, swords, bayonets, extended royal dockyards, new 
barracks, coastal fortifications, military roads, organizational capacities, 
etc. In short the realm’s military and naval capital had been significantly 
increased by wartime expenditures, by expropriations (principally ships 
and a small indemnity from the enemy) and by some technological 
innovations. Twenty-three years of conflict, allowed Britain’s victorious 
and hegemonic state not merely to demobilize most of its armed forces, 
but to radically reduce future expenditures on the capital goods required 
by the army and navy to defend the realm and its extended commerce 
and empire overseas and maintain order over several difficult decades of 
industrialization and urbanization after the treaty of Vienna had stabilized 
the balance of power in Europe. 83  
Factoring in the benefits as well as the costs of crowding out are 
difficult enough to specify and model. Meanwhile, the prospects for 
striking anything other than a conjectural balance sheet look entirely 
remote. 
 
 
6. War and the Intensified Exploitation of the Island’s 
Cultivatable Land, Minerals, Industries and Technologies 
Once at war British statesmen sought to augment and exploit the 
potential of the Island’s natural resources and national system of 
production to the full. 84  As mercantilists appreciated the need to 
 
83 F. Crouzet, A History of the European Economy (London, 2001); F. Crouzet, The 
Second Hundred Years War: Some Reflections,’ in French History, 10 (1996) pp. 432-
50 and P.W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (Oxford, 1994). 
84 The political economy of power and warfare is analysed by the  predecessors (not 
the precursors) of Adam Smith, vide: T.W. Hutchinson, The Emergence of Political 
Economy (Oxford, 1988). Mercantilist views on the strategic necessities for conserving 
bullion as a “war chest” are covered in Magnusson (ed.), Mercantilist Economics and 
C. Perrota, ‘Is the Mercantilist Theory of the Favourable Balance of Trade Really 
Erroneous?’ in History of Political Economy, 23 (1991), pp. 302-55 and R.C. Blitz, 
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minimize the burdens of taxation, to contain the crowding out of private 
investment and to reduce dependence on imports, and thereby reserve 
hard currency for such strategic priorities as payments to allied, 
mercenary and British troops committed to conflict on the mainland of 
Europe and for payments to provision, refit and repair naval warships 
resting in ports overseas.85  
Not surprisingly warfare depressed the kingdom’s rate of growth 
and pushed the domestic economy off a rapid course of recovery it had 
been on during the decade between the end of the war with the United 
States and its allies (1783) and the opening of the long conflict with 
Revolutionary France some ten years later. Unfortunately the macro-
economic data set for the analysis of trends and fluctuations from 1783-
1821  (when the monetary system returned to full conventibility  and 
taxation reverted to peace time levels) is neither extensive in range, 
adequate in quality nor sufficiently complete in chronological coverage to 
provide acceptable records to analyse and  quantify the overall 
performance of agriculture, industry and foreign trade for a period of 
something close to three decades when the kingdom’s economy operated 
under conditions of warfare, inflation and its aftermath. 
Several indices used to measure the long term growth of the 
national product, agricultural and industrial outputs, average wages and 
prices remain in dispute. More serious, for  attempts to quantify the 
immediate impact of war are published figures based upon interpolations 
between benchmark years which are too widely separated in time to 
 
‘Mercantilist Policies and the Pattern of World Trade ,’ in Journal of Economic History, 
27 (1967) pp. 39-55. 
85 They are articulated in all the statesman’s papers for the period deposited in the 
British Libraries Collection of Additional Manuscripts. Vide the papers of Auckland, 
Herries, Liverpool, Rose, Vansittart and Wellington, as well as the Pitt Papers at the 
Public Record Office and debates in Parliament. M. Sherwig’s Guineas and 
Gunpowder. British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1969) elaborates on the role of wartime   transfers of bullion to allies and 
mercenaries. 
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expose fluctuation in outputs, incomes and prices imputable to both 
negative and positive influences from engagement in conflict.  For 
purposes of this survey, I will consider both quantitative and qualitative 
sources (published and unpublished) for agriculture, industry and 
international commerce and attempt to offer some plausible conjectures 
about the significance of the war for the growth of an economy passing 
through the First Industrial Revolution. 
For example, between 1793 and 1815 the expansion of domestic 
(including Irish) agriculture already underway, probably accelerated to a 
rate of advance that continued down to mid-century.86  The kingdom’s  
agrarian sector played an important role in mobilizing provisions and 
organic raw materials for the forces of the crown. Along with previous 
conflicts the French wars remained labour intensive. Budgetary estimates 
indicate that very high proportions of the revenues allocated by 
Parliament for the Army  and Navy were for the pay and provisions of 
British soldiers and sailors. 87 While fiscal data suggest that the incidence 
 
86  A range of growth rates for agriculture are reported by R.C. Allen, ‘Tracking the 
Agricultural Revolution in England,’ in Economic History review, 52 (1990), pp. 209-35 
and his contribution, R.C. Allen, ‘Agriculture during the Industrial Revolution,’ to R.F. 
Floud and P. Johnson eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, 1700-60 
(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 96-116. The standard text on the agricultural revolution is M. 
Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England. The Transformation of the Agrarian 
Economy, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1996). A good thesis on the stimulus imparted by 
the war to Irish agriculture is by A.J. Fitzpatrick, The Economic Effects of Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars on Ireland (Manchester PhD, 1973). 
87 The  allocation of funds raised to prosecute warfare across sectors of the economy 
are recorded in various ways by the several departments of state (the Admiralty and 
Navy Board, the War Office and Board of Transport, the Transport Office, the Board for 
Barracks etc and at Regiment levels). The records make it virtually impossible for 
modern historians to aggregate data that would provide a valid tabulation of wartime 
expenditures for purposes of economic analysis. Commissions and Committees of 
Enquiry established for purposes of auditing military and naval expenditure also found 
the tasks of post hoc audit too complex to comprehend and control. (Vide the Reports 
of Committees and Commissioners appointed to “Examine, Take and State the Public 
Accounts of the Kingdom”, 1780-91 volumes II and 12 and 13, Journals of the House of 
Commons, volumes 38-42 and Parliamentary Papers 1790-91 (92). Parliament 
continued to attempt to take control of expenditures of the armed forces during and 
after the wars with France. Vide: reports from Commissioners of Naval and Military 
Inquiry in Parliamentary Papers, Parliamentary Papers 1805 (2), 1810 (2), 1810-11 (4), 
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of the incremental taxes imposed to fund the wars of 1793-1815 may 
have fallen  with  particular severity (both directly and indirectly) upon the 
production of foodstuffs and raw materials and upon the incomes and 
wealth of farmers and landowners.88 
Fortuitously but fortunately ministers (seeking to secure compliance 
with their increasing demands for taxation and requests for loans from 
affluent groups of aristocratic landowners and tenant farmers of the 
United Kingdom)  the agricultural sector contained both a sufficient area 
of under-utilized but cultivable land and growing supplies of under-
employed labour available to respond  elastically to rapidly rising 
demands for food and organic raw materials.89  These demands 
emanated basically from the acceleration in population growth and 
internal migration to towns, but were supplemented by  “incremental 
purchases” by the state for provisions, fibres, horses, leather, timber and 
building materials to support the mobilization of young men for service in 
the army, navy, ordnance, and militia.90  
Contemporary observers reports from the Farmers and Monthly 
Magazines and Arthur Young’s Annals of Agriculture as well as the 
testimonies of numerous farmers, landowners, agents and others with 
professional knowledge - who appeared before Parliamentary committees 
investigating the state of the agrarian economy as it adjusted to post war 
deflation, demobilization and the persistence of high taxation - have left a 
 
1812 (4), 1817 (4) and Committees on Finance in Journals of the House of Commons, 
volumes 41, 42. Reporting and auditing problems have been studied by J.E.D. Binney, 
British Public Finance and Administration (Oxford, 1958). My attempt to reclassify a 
sample of budgetary estimates laid before Parliament during war suggest that 
something like 70-75% of expenditures on the armed forces were allocated to 
foodstuffs and organic raw materials produced by the kingdom’s agricultural sector. 
Estimates were published annually in the Journals of the House of Commons and are 
cited in fn. 35. 
88  O’Brien, ‘Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal State,’ pp. 86-200. 
89 Allen, The British Industrial Revolution, pp. 59, 62 and 67. 
90 See footnotes 35, 86 and 88 and Journals of the House of Commons, which report 
annual budgetary estimates. 
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very considerable body of evidence for economic historians to consider 
about the impact of war.  This cache of localized description and ad hoc 
statistics surveyed and analysed by generations of agrarian historians 
describes how elastically British and Irish landowners and farmers had 
responded to incentives to profit from the circumstances and conditions 
created by wars with Revolutionary France. Thereafter the sector 
confronted the challenges of the immediate post war decades to adjust to 
falling prices for primary products, the resumption of imports from the 
mainland, intensified competition from the integration of Ireland into the 
kingdom’s economy, the persistence of higher taxes to service a 
Government debt that had reached the extraordinary level of some 2.5 
times the national income, for an enlarged and extended military and 
naval establishment and elevated levels for welfare expenditures on the 
rural poor.91 
Attempts in recent years to quantify this tradition of dense narrative 
histories of agrarian development that accompanied and sustained the 
kingdom’s transition to an urban industrial economy with the theoretically 
required range of statistical indicators are still underway and have 
become an area of dispute about “facts” among cliometricians.92 The 
 
91 The best known observers of the realm’s agrarian economy as it developed from 
1783-1846 include Arthur Young and John Sinclair. An enormous range of 
contemporary comment (with data) is contained in the publications of the Goldsmiths 
Collection of Economic Literature at the University of London Library.  Year by year 
reports on the state of agriculture, country by country, are reported in the Monthly, 
Gentlemen’s and Farmers magazines and the Annals of Agriculture. The testimonies 
and data of landowners, farmers and managers of estates who appeared before 
Parliamentary Committees can be read in reports from Committees of the House of 
Commons, volumes 9 (1798), 1800  1801, and in Parliamentary Papers 1806-07 (2), 
1808 (2), 1809 (2), 1813-14 (4), 1813-14 (5), 1819 (3), 1821 (9), 1836 (8). The last 
three Parliamentary Papers contain reports with minutes of evidence related to 
agricultural distress after the war. Modern interpretations have been published by A.H. 
John, ‘Farming in Wartime, 1793-1815,’ in E.H. Jones and G.E. Mingay (eds.), Land, 
Labour and Population in the Industrial Revolution (London, 1967), pp. 28-47; G. 
Huekel , ‘English Farming Profits during the Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,’ in 
Explorations in Economic History, 13 (1976) pp. 331-45. 
92 The modern bibliography is extensive and referenced in texts by Overton, 
Agricultural Revolution; E.L, Jones, Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 
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indices currently in print for long term annual rates of growth for 
agricultural output, investment, profits, rents, wages and for trends in 
yields, labour and total factor productivities are not founded upon any  
standardized and accepted body of official data. Statistics for total 
production have not been constructed on the same basis and are not 
tabulated to refer to comparable chronologies. Variations in the statistics 
available for histories of agriculture 1763-1846 have not been resolved.93 
Nevertheless the clustered quantified evidence in print supports some 
general impressions: namely, that for long stretches of the eighteenth 
century the overall performance of agriculture as measured in terms of 
rates of change in output or productivity could be represented as 
“sluggish” and unimpressive.94 
 
1974) and several seminal articles focussed on agriculture during in the aftermath of 
war by: M.C. Burr, ‘Trade Depression Following the Napoleonic War,’ in Economica, 2 
(1921), pp. 159-79; N. Gash, ‘Rural Unemployment, 1815-34,’ in Economic History 
Review, 6 (1935), pp. 90-93 and ‘After Waterloo: British Society and the Legacy of the 
Napoleonic Wars,’ in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 28 (1978)m pp. 145-
57; E.L. Jones, ‘The Agricultural Labour Market in England, 1793-1872,’ in Economic 
History Review, 17 (1964), pp. 322-38; A.H. John, ‘Farming in Wartime, 1793-1815,’ 
pp. 28-47; G. Hueckel, ‘The Napoleonic Wars, Output Growth in England, 1793-1815,’ 
in Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973), pp. 309-29, ‘English Farming, Profits during 
the Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,’ and ‘Relative Prices and Supply Response in 
English Agriculture during the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Economic History Review, 29 
(1976) pp. 401-14; S. McDonald, ‘Agricultural Response to a Changing Market during 
the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Economic History Review, 33 (1980), pp. 59-71; A.R. Wilkes, 
‘Readjustments in Arable Farming after the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Agricultural History 
Review, 28 (1982), pp. 96-103. 
93  The modern wave of cliometric research began with classic studies by P. Deane and 
W.A. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959: Trends and Structures (Cambridge, 
1969) and revisions by N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth During the Industrial 
Revolution (Oxford, 1985) followed by extensive and ongoing debate over the numbers 
summarized by N.F.R. Crafts, ‘The First Industrial Revolution: Resolving the Slow 
Growth/Rapid Industrialization Paradox ,’ in Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 3 (2005), pp. 525-35. A range of estimates for the rate of growth of output 
tabulated by Allen, ‘Agriculture during the Industrial Revolution,’ was published before 
recent ingenious attempts were made to bring consistency to the range of estimates in 
print for the growth of per capita incomes. 
94  Allen, ‘Agriculture during the Industrial Revolution,’; G. Clark, ‘Yields per acre in 
English agriculture, 1250-1860: Evidence from Labour Inputs,’ in Economic History 
Review, 44 (1991), pp. 445-60; R.C. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman. The 
Agricultural Development of the South Midlands, 1450-1850 (Oxford, 1992); R.V. 
Jackson, ‘Growth and Deceleration in English Agriculture,’ in Economic History Review,  
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Dates and years for turning points and discontinuities vary. 
Nevertheless, most extant exercises in data reconstruction suggest that 
an acceleration in the kingdom’s agricultural output, investment and 
perhaps in factor productivities either began and certainly persisted 
during the war with Revolutionary France.  It probably came discernibly 
on stream after 1800, continued during the so-called decades of 
agricultural depression and distress in the aftermath of the war down to 
Caird’s Golden Age of Agriculture which began after the repeal of the 
Corn Laws to 1873.95 
Modern exercises in “conjectural quantification” are not inconsistent 
with a historiography of agricultural development during the industrial 
revolution that includes upswings in rates of growth, investment and 
productivity growth proceeding over two long cycles of rising and then 
falling prices of primary products between the outbreak of the French 
wars in 1793 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.96 Contemporary 
well referenced perceptions in traditional agrarian history and statistical 
guesstimates all suggest that the owners and managers of the resources 
contained within the kingdom’s traditional, dominant and rather un-
 
38C (1985) pp. 333-57; Overton’s, Agricultural Revolution provides a more optimistic 
interpretation. 
95 Allen, The British Revolution; Allen, ‘Agriculture in the Industrial Revolution,’; G. 
Clark, ‘Farm Wages and Living Standards in the Industrial Revolution: England, 1670-
1869,’ in Economic History Review, 54 (2001), pp. 477-505 and G. Hueckel’s articles 
cited in fn. 91; E.L. Jones, Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1974); L.P. 
Adams, Agricultural Depression and Farm Relief in England, 1815-22 (London, 1972); 
B. Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce (Oxford, 1977). 
96  Investment data, are from Feinstein, ‘Capital Formation in Great Britain,’ and 
‘Capital Accumulation and the Industrial Revolution.’ The rise in numbers of acres 
enclosed by private acts of Parliament was particularly marked between 1800-15.  Vide 
B. Holderness, ‘Agriculture ,’ in C. Feinstein and S. Pollard (eds.), Studies in Capital 
Formation in the United Kingdom (Oxford, 1988), pp. 9-34. The years of distress are 
covered by L.P. Adams, Agricultural Depression and Farm Relief in England, 1815-22  
(London, 1922); N. Gash, ‘Rural Unemployment, 1815-34,’ in Economic History 
Review, 6 (1935), pp. 145-57 and A.R. Wilks, ‘Readjustments in Arable Farming after 
the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Agricultural History Review, 2 (1982) pp. 96-103. The “golden 
age” is described in C. Abel et al, History of Agriculture, 1846-1914 (Newton Abbot, 
1964), chs. 1-3. 
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progressive sector for primary production responded  to wartime 
incentives of rising prices, favourable shifts in the inter-sectoral terms of 
trade, easier and flexible access to loans and credit and the lagging 
wages of their quasi-feudal workforce by raising rates of investment and 
the diffusion of known techniques for cultivation to feed the realm’s 
growing and urbanizing population, while at the same time supplying  the 
state with extra taxes as well as the additional provisions, fibres, horses, 
fodder, timber and other organic materials required to wage labour 
intensive warfare.97 Contemporary observations and the historiography 
support the view that during war the kingdom’s agricultural output grew at 
impressive rates basically by taking waste, scrub and unenclosed land 
into cultivation. Landowners, farmers and their elastic supplies of labour 
(that became cheaper in real terms) pushed the extensive margin for 
cultivation outwards, consolidated estates into managerial units with 
larger scale farms, drained, marled and limed the soils and supplemented 
the reclamation of under-cultivated land by speeding up the diffusion of 
familiar and proven techniques for the growth of crops and rearing of farm 
animals.98 
After 1815 when prices of primary products declined sharply and 
the real burdens from higher levels of taxation, poor relief and elevated 
rents (previously veiled by inflation) became exposed,  representatives of 
the agricultural sector in  Parliament sought relief by reducing and shifting 
 
97 G. Clark, ‘The Long March of History. Farm wages, population and economic growth, 
England, 1209-1869,’ in Economic History Review, 60 (2007), p. 97-135 and A.H. 
John, ‘Farming in Wartime’ and the articles by Hueckel cited in fn. 91. 
98 G. Clark, ‘Land rental values and the agrarian economy: England and Wales,’ in 
European Review of Economic History, 6 (2002), pp. 281-308; R. Wordie, ‘Rent 
Movements and the English Tenant Farmer, 1700-1839,’ in R. Uselding (ed.), 
Research in Economic History, 6 (1981), pp. 192-215; M. Turner, Enclosures in Britain, 
1750-1830  (London, 1984); H.G. Hunt, ‘Landownership and Enclosures,’ in Economic 
History Review, 10 (1957) pp. 36-48; Hueckel’s articles cited in fn. 91; Hilton, Corn, 
Cash and Commerce; Gordon, Political Economy in Parliament; Gambles, The 
Boundaries of Political Economy. Data for the wage/rental ratio for this period is from 
Clark, ‘Land, rental values etc.’ pp. 281-308. 
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part of  its tax burdens onto the urban economy.99 Landlords diversified 
their portfolios of wealth into minerals, transportation and urban 
property.100 In summary the upswing in agricultural prices (associated 
with flexible money supplies, a pronounced shift in the inter-sectoral 
terms of trade, intensified demands from the armed forces and enhanced 
protection from high freight rates by ship) all operated to pull  owners and 
managers of agrarian land and capital into a “cage” from whence (despite 
post war deflation - mitigated by the infamous protection from corn laws 
and repeal of the income tax) helped to maintain imperatives to invest, 
innovate and reduce costs. That option had become unavoidable for 
agrarian elites endeavouring to preserve their wealth, incomes and, 
above all, their political power.101  
In short: the wartime inflation followed by post war deflation seems 
in outcome to have strengthened an ongoing longer run impetus to 
agricultural progress. After 1815 the growth of output continued. Agreed, 
this conjuncture slowed the pace structural charge towards an urbanized 
industrial economy. But the price and rent cycle coinciding with warfare 
may be represented as a fortuitous interlude which helped circumvent the 
tendency of an otherwise less than progressive sector owned by a 
powerful ancien regime of landowners and managed by conservative 
tenant farmers to circumvent the tendencies of agriculture to run into 
diminishing returns and thereby to block long term progress towards an 
urban industrial economy? 102 After the war agriculture continued to 
 
99 J.V. Beckett, The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914 (Oxford, 1986); N. Gash, 
Aristocracy and People, Britain 1815-1865 (London, 1979. 
100 J. Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt and the Estates System. English Landownership, 
1650-1950 (Oxford, 1994) Chs. 6 and 7; M. Turner (ed.), Malthus and his Times 
(London, 1986) 
101 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Agriculture and the Home Market for English Industry, 1660-1820,’ in 
English Historical Review c. (1985), pp. 773-99; M. Turner, et al, Agricultural Rent in 
England, 1660-1914 (Cambridge, 1997). 
102 Allen, British Industrial Revolution ch. 3; F. Crouzet, ‘The Impact of the French wars 
on the British Economy,’ in H. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution, 
(London, 1989), pp. 189-210. 
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develop and to support industrialization. While the famous controversy 
over the corn laws never polarized British society into any prolonged 
politically destabilizing and unprofitable conflict between “agrarians and 
industrializers”  of the kind that hindered development on the mainland. 
Comparable geopolitical and macro-economic conditions 
surrounded Britain’s industrial sector as it proceeded along its fam
transformation  between 1763-1846. The annual growth rates (as 
constructed by Deane and Cole and revised in several publications by
Crafts and Harley) reveal a decade of sharp acceleration to 1.8% per 
annum 1780-90, followed by an almost imperceptible decline in an
rate of growth interpolated from 1790-1811, succeeded by further 
accelerations (2.8% and 3.6%) over the decades 1811-21 and 1821-31. 
The leading critic of these estimates  continues to insist upon his own 
claims for a “more representative” but also virtually unknowable set of 
prices and qualities for the heterogeneous array of cotton textiles that 
could be used to construct  properly weighted estimates of aggregated 
value added for the kingdom’s  rapidly growing industrial sector. Cue
Esteban offers an alternative (perhaps equally plausible?) index for 
industrial production that displays even higher rates of growth over th
period from 1770-1831.He recognized, however, that we have “long 
reached the stage of diminishin
                                                            
103 B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the 
d 
e views 
, 
Making of the Modern World (London, 1967). 
104 Growth rates for total industrial output which (unlike agriculture) can be constructe
within more contained margins of error from records for annual production covering 
“significant” share of total industrial output but also  remain controversial. The rates 
cited in the text were constructed and defended by Crafts and Harley against th
of their critics. Vide. N.F. Crafts and K. Harley, ‘Output, Growth and the British 
Industrial Revolution: a restatement of the Crafts-Harley view,’ in Economic History 
Review, 45 (1992), pp. 703-30. C.K. Harley and N.F.R. Crafts, ‘Cotton textiles and 
industrial output growth during the Industrial Revolution,’ in Economic History Review
48 (1995), pp. 134-44. A serious challenge to the weights accorded to cotton textile 
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For present purposes I simply note that on none of three rival 
indices do the wars from 1793-1815 appear to have precipitated 
fundamental discontinuities (negative or positive) in the pace and pattern 
of industrialization. Indeed nobody at the time claimed they had. Most 
mercantilist literature published during and after the wars under titles 
extolling “the wealth, power and resources of the British empire” was 
basically concerned to reassure Britons that their state possessed access 
to all the resources required to defend the realm and protect and extend 
its colonies and commerce overseas and support industrialization. 105 
Turning next to that most frequently explored connexion between 
warfare and industrial growth, namely technology, historians also observe 
that in contrast to the great wars of the past century, only a confined 
range of inventions with spin offs for the long run growth of the civilian 
economy (or indeed for the effectiveness of the armed forces) have been 
directly associated to demands generated by the widespread and 
 
production in their index which in effect augments the rate of industrial production has 
been mounted by J. Cuenca-Esterban, ‘British Textile Prices? 1770-1831: are British 
Growth Rates worth Revising once again?’ in Economic History Review, 47 (1994), pp. 
66-105 with the reply  embodying another set of cotton textile prices was published by  
C.K. Harley, ‘Cotton Textile Prices and the Industrial Revolution,’ in Economic History 
Review,  5 (1998) pp. 49-83. In his attempt to mediate his way through the range of 
estimates now available to quantify rates of growth for gross domestic product, 
agriculture and industry, J. Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution,’ in C. Floud 
and Johnson (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, pp, 1027 
preferred to concentrated upon estimates based upon new research by G. Clark, ‘The 
Secret History of the Industrial Revolution,’; U.C. Davis, Working Paper in Economic 
History. Clark’s estimates in this and other papers cited above tend to show that 
discontinuities on nearly all indicators deployed to measure trends in economic growth 
occurred after and not before 1800.  Is there a consensus in prospect? 
105 L. Magnusson, Mercantilism: the Shaping of an Economic Language (London 1994). 
There is a substantial bibliography of pamphlets and books written to refute the claims 
of radicals that the British economy had been severely damaged by the strains placed 
upon it by taxes and loans raised to mobilize resources for warfare. The counter and 
mainstream tradition of writing in mercantilist economics and political arithmetic 
continued for decades after the final victory at Waterloo and is well covered by the 
Goldsmiths Collection of Economics Literature at the University of London Library. 
Characteristic writers include: G. Chalmers, Comparative Views and  J. Lowe, The 
Present State of England. 
  
47
                                                           
protracted conflict of 1791-1815. 106 For France the deployment of 
airborne balloons for observation, and interchangeable parts for the 
assembly of weapons are cited. 107 For Britain there are references to 
experiments with the canning of food, metal tanks to hold water pumped 
by steam power onto warships, biscuit making machinery and Brunel’s 
blocks and pulleys for the rigging of battleships. 108 
Future research might uncover the appearance of other inventions 
associated with utilitarian capital goods, materials and modes of 
organization designed and developed in or for the armed forces. What 
seems more likely is an elaboration upon sequences of developments 
and improvements associated with the production of armaments, with the 
spread of steam power and, above all, with the construction and 
maintenance of warships with potential spill-overs and externalities for 
post war shipbuilding, metallurgy and engineering as well as connexions 
to the network of organizations and enterprises engaged with shipping 
and commerce overseas that experienced booms as well as slumps in 
wartime. 109 
 
106 K.W. Chase, Firearms – A Global History to 1700 (Cambridge, 2003); M. Roe-
Smith, Military Enterprise and technical Change. Perspectives on American Experience 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1985); W. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed 
Force and Society since 1000 (Chicago, 1982); R. O’Connell, Of Arms and Men. A 
History of War, Weapons and Aggression (Oxford , 1989); M. Van Crefeld, Technology 
and War from 2000BC to the Present (London, 1989). 
107 K. Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France (Princeton, 
1999). 
108 Harvey, Collision of  Empires, pp. 51-57; C. Emsley, British Society and the French 
Wars, 1793-1815 (London, 1979); C. Trebilock, ‘Spinoff in British Economic History,’ in 
Economic History Review, 22 (1969) pp. 74-90; C. Fox, The Arts of Industry in the Age 
of Enlightenment (New Haven, 2009); Mokyr found a few minor connexions – Mokyr, 
Enlightened Economy, p. 344. 
109 Connexions to shipping and shipbuilding are elaborated in the final section. Few 
claims have been validated by historians for anything approximating to development of 
a military-industrial complex as part of the industrial revolution – vide. P. Deane, ‘War 
and Industrialization,’ in J.M. Winter (ed.), War and Economic Development 
(Cambridge, 1975), pp. 91-102; John, ‘War and the British Economy,’ pp. 329-44 draws 
positive connexions but for earlier periods. 
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This raises the unanswerable question of whether the cyclical 
upswings associated with the fortunes of mercantilist warfare engendered 
expectations that promoted research and development, investment and 
ultimately growth?  Such connexions could be heuristically pursued by 
analysing how the fiscal, monetary and commercial policies implemented 
by the state to wage war may, on balance, have promoted benign 
outcomes for the longer term development of major industries. 110 For 
example, the shift after 1797 into an inconvertible currency and a greater 
reliance on taxation relaxed the terms and  expanded conduits for access 
to loans and credits even for riskier ventures. They reinforced  
established traditions of fiscal mercantilism that operated to promote 
exports; maintain lower rates of taxation upon raw materials and inputs 
utilized by industry. They also  elevated protection against imports of 
manufactures up to virtually prohibitive levels and accorded relatively 
favourable fiscal treatment to technologically progressive manufactures 
(like cotton textiles) as well as strategically significant industries (such as 
iron, coal and shipbuilding). By default the state condoned as 
administratively unavoidable the widespread evasion of liabilities for direct 
taxation by the owners and managers of industrial and commercial 
capital. 111 
 
110 Connexion s between the macro economic monetary and fiscal policies and the 
development of a sample of British industries have been elaborated in previously 
published papers. Vide P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars 1793-1815 in the Long Run Growth of the British Economy,’ in Review, 12 
(1989), pp. 335-96; ‘Taxation for British Mercantilism from the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) 
to the Peace of Paris (1783).’ in R. Sanchez-Torres (ed.), War, State and 
Development. Fiscal Military States in the Eighteenth Century (Pamplona, 2008), pp. 
295-356, ‘Taxation for the Wars against France’ and O’Brien, ‘British Incomes and 
Property in the Early Nineteenth Century,’ in Economic History Review, 12 (1959), pp. 
255-67 
111 O’Brien, ‘Taxation for the Wars against France’; J.V. Beckett and M. Turner, 
‘Taxation and Economic Growth in Eighteenth Century England,’ in Economic History 
Review, 43 (1990), pp. 377-403; Bowen, War and British Society and the bulk of 
pamphlets on fiscal policy contained in the Goldsmiths Collection of the University of 
London Library.  
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Monetary policy sustained inflationary conditions for several 
industries (coal, iron, copper ores, metal, building materials, leather, 
hosiery and candles) for which data for both wage rates and prices for 
outputs happen to be available.  That data allows us to observe and 
measure a classic symptom of periods of inflation, namely a lag of wages 
behind prices and  an unintended transfer of income from labour to 
capital, savings and investment. 112  
Nevertheless nearly all industries became afflicted and constrained 
in greater or lesser degrees by excise and customs duties levied on their 
inputs of raw materials and intermediate goods and upon their final 
outputs. These negative but variable effects from higher rates of taxation 
upon the growth in the volumes of output produced by a wide array of 
industries and services have been analysed elsewhere.  
At the time fiscal policy generated the greatest attention from 
interest groups behind prolonged debates in Parliament and a voluminous 
bibliography of contemporary comment that contains contributions to 
political economy. Most of the authors of this polemical literature deplored 
the social incidence and adverse economic effects of higher taxation. 
Predictably they also neglected to counterbalance their condemnations of 
taxation not only against potential outcomes flowing from military defeat, 
but also against some  unintended but not insignificant longer term effects 
that emanated from several fiscal measures designed to mobilize 
resources for the forces of the crown. 113 
 
112 This familiar lag and its implications for standards of living  is discussed by G.N. Von 
Tunzelman, ‘Trends in Real Wages, 1750-1850, pp. 33-49 and F. Crouzet, ‘Guerre et 
Salaires. Le Cas De L’Angleterre.’ His data displays a lag in real wages even for skilled 
workers pp. 71-85.  The lag of agricultural wages behind rents has been exposed by 
Clark, ‘Land Rental Values.’ 
113 W. Kennedy, English Taxation, 1640-1799 (London, 1913) and T. Dome, The 
Political Economy of Public Finance in Britain, 1767-1873 (London, 2004). The debates 
in Parliament are in W. Cobbett, Parliamentary History, Cobbett’s Parliamentary 
Debates, vol.1, 1803-04 to vol. 22, 1812 and Hansards, Parliamentary Debates, 24-31 
(1812-13 – 1815). 
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For example, transitions in scale and scope, already underway 
before 1793, in two major industries ,coal and iron, (restored to positions 
of prominence in recent accounts of the industrial revolution) were almost 
certainly accelerated by fiscal and commercial policies and shifts towards 
autarky  promoted by the conflict at sea. 114  Before the war something 
like 30% to 40% of the kingdom’s annual consumption of timber and bar 
iron took the form of imports from Norway, Sweden, Russia, Prussia and 
other countries with access to ports along the Baltic Sea.115 Both raw 
materials particularly timber, which also provided sources of heat and 
energy and household fuel, had been subjected to complex but relatively 
low burdens of customs duties calibrated to favour imports in British 
ships. 
During the war, duties on Russian and Swedish bar iron 
doubled.116 On Baltic timber, tariffs rose in two steps from 6.5/- to 28.5
load in 1809 when ministers under political and geopolitical pressure 
reduced the kingdom’s dependence on that region by raising the duty to 
58/- a load in order to favour production and trade in Imperial (Canadia
timber. 117 That contested decision was occasioned by the risks of 
predation from enemy privateers, embargoes by northern powers
 
114 A.E. Wrigley, Continuity, Chance and Change (Cambridge, 1988); Allen, The British 
Industrial Revolution and P. Mathias, ‘Energy and the Industrial Revolution,’ in Revista 
de Storia Economica, 19 (2003), pp. 109-133. 
115 According to Patrick Colquhoun, more than a third of Britain’s supplies of timber 
continued to be imported from the Baltic even in wartime. P. Colquhoun, Treatise on 
the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire (London, 1812), p. 90. J.R. 
McCulloch estimated British iron production at 68,000 tons for 1788 compared to 
50,000 tons imported from Sweden and Russia. J.R. McCulloch, A Dictionary of 
Commerce (London, 1839), p. 735 and Public Record Office, Customs 10901 for 
imports. 
116 Duties on bar iron from Public Record Office Customs 10901 and Report of the 
Custom Tariff of the United Kingdom, Parliamentary Paper 1898 (85). 
117 Timber duties are set out in the ‘Report of the Select Committee to Take into 
Consideration the Duties on Timber,’ Parliamentary Papers 1835 (19), p. 384 and 
Accounts and Papers, Parliamentary Paper 1826-27 (18), p. 267. 
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domestic pressures for imperial preferences. 118  It was above all 
sustained by the massive augmentation in the costs of shipping of heav
and bulky raw materials, such as timber and bar iron from the Baltic to 
British ports in wartime.119 Already by 1808-11 the average price (cif) of a
load of Baltic timber had risen by four to five times the pre-war levels.120 
Thereafter and in competition with Canadian imports, the volume and
average price declined sharply over the final stages of the war, but n
enough to counteract the pressures from self-interested groups of 
merchants, shippers and owners of British woodlands for the continuation 
of imperial preferences when the high costs of freighting timber across 
the Atlantic were exposed after 
Bar iron of the highest quality continued to be purchased from 
Sweden and Russia and used to manufacture weapons for the army and 
navy. But the total volume imported decreased from around 50,000 tons 
in 1788-92 to about 20,000 tons and falling (1811-15). 122  
Changes to tariffs and more significantly to the risks and costs of 
importing wood and  bar iron from the Baltic (initiated and sustained by 
 
118 Pressure group activity can be traced in Public Record Office Board of Trade 
Papers,  BT5/10 and Report of the Select Committee Appointed to Consider the Means 
of Improving and Maintaining the Foreign Trade of the Country in Parliamentary Papers 
1821 (6). 
119 Vide Reports in Monthly Magazine, January, March and July 1801, June 1803 and 
February 1809; R.G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (Cambridge, Mass., 1926); F. 
Crouzet, L’economie britannique et le blocus continental, pp. 91-93, 337, 34-45, 398 
and 420-22; Journals of the House of Commons annually 1793-1815 include 
appendices of data related to prices of imported timber. 
120 H. Bliss, The Timber Trade (Goldsmiths Collection, University of London Library, 
London, 1822) p. 70 and T. Cooke, Thoughts and Details on High and Low Prices 
(London, 1824), p. 417.  S. Cook, Observations on the Timber Trade (London, 
Goldsmiths Collection, 1821); Bliss, Timber Trade; Parliamentary Paper 1821 (6); 
McCulloch, Commercial Dictionary, pp. 1150-54. 
121 The tariffs are recorded in Customs 10901 and Parliamentary Paper 1898 (85). The 
wartime history of the timber trade is covered by Bliss, Timber Trade.   
122  B. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p. 140; C. Evans et al, ‘Baltic Iron 
and the British Iron Industry in the Eighteenth Century,’ in Economic History Review, 55 
(2002), pp. 642-55. Purchases by the armed forces are recorded in War Office Papers, 
Public Record Office WO281; Appendices to House of Commons Journals and reports 
from Commissioners of Military Inquiry in Parliamentary Papers 1806 (2), 1806 (5) and 
1812 (4). 
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warfare and its aftermath) raised incentives to accelerate the already 
ongoing process of import substitution by Britain’s coal and iron 
industries. Both industries successfully resisted attempts by ministers, 
desperately seeking tax revenues, to impose excises on their outputs. 
While iron, much more than coal, benefitted directly and indirectly from 
augmented demands from the navy, army and ordnance departments for 
their products. Both industries also gained from the high rates of 
investment maintained in wartime to extend, integrate and improve the 
country’s system of internal transportation, canals, rivers and roads as 
well as the extra protection afforded by a greatly enlarged navy to 
transportation by sea around the coasts of the Isles.123  
Responding  to incentives heightened by war to replace imported 
timber with domestically produced, coke smelted iron, puddled iron for 
Swedish and Russian imports of bar iron and wood fuel with domestic 
coal (mined and more easily  and more cheaply transported along the 
canals, rivers and protected coastal waterways of the Isles) both heavy 
industries experienced remarkable accelerations in their rates of growth 
that cannot be disconnected from stimulus afforded by the state’s 
engagement in warfare. Domestic pig iron production probably multiplied 
by a factor of 3.5 between 1788-92 and 1811-15 – a period when the 
price of bar iron declined in real terms and when imports fell from about 
43% to 6% of total consumption. 124By 1821 the industries long transition 
 
123 Raw data for investment in internal transportation are available in the form of the 
numbers of bills and estimated costs submitted to Parliament for expenditures on the 
construction of turnpike roads, canals, improvements to rivers. They are cited in A. 
Gayer et al, Growth and Fluctuations in the British Economy, and calibrated and 
revised by C. Feinstein and S. Pollard (eds.), Studies in Capital Formation in the United 
Kingdom, 1750-1920 (Oxford, 1988) and by Feinstein, in ‘Capital Formation in the 
United Kingdom.’ 
124 P. Riden, ‘The Output of the British Iron Industry before 1879,’ in Economic History 
Review, 30 (1977) pp. 442-59; C.K. Hyde, The British Iron Industry (Princeton, 1977); 
R. Church (ed.), The Coal and Iron Industries (Oxford, 1994). The  development of both 
industries has been cogently analysed by Allen, British Industrial Revolution, chs 4 and 
9. 
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from charcoal to coke smelting was completed and it had recovered from 
the excess capacity of the immediate post war years. 125  
Although the coal industry may not have experienced anything 
impressive by way of total factor productivity growth during the industrial 
revolution the evidence for accelerated rates of expansion during wartime 
remains unmistakeable. 126 Total output of all mines may have doubled 
between 1790 and 1815 while real prices per ton at points of delivery 
outside London probably declined because tolls at other ports remained 
lower than they were in the capital. 127  Even for consumers in London 
rather late in the day, the government began to regulate combinations of 
producers, shippers and distributors, selling coal to households and 
industries located in the capital. 128   At the same time taxes upon exports 
were jacked up by 70%. This presumably increased the elasticity of coal 
supply for domestic use and restricted the diffusion of cheap British fuel 
 
125 T.S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester, 1924) and H. 
Scrivenor, A Comprehensive History of the Iron Industry (London, 1841) 
126 The exercise by Clark and Jacks to measure total factor productivity for the coal 
mining is based on data from the Northumberland Durham coalfield and deliveries  by 
coastal transportation into London, vide G. Clark and D. Jacks, ‘Coal and the Industrial 
Revolution 1700-1869,’ in European Review of Economic History 11 (2007), pp. 39-73. 
By the late eighteenth century only 30% and declining of mined coal came from that 
coalfield and was delivered down the coast to London. Vide. J. Mundella’s estimates 
and discussion in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 10 (1878) pp. 87-112 and 
McCulloch, Commercial Dictionary, pp. 290-93 and 433. Estimates for total output are 
offered by M. Flinn, History of the British Coal Industry,  2 vols (Oxford, 1984), table 1.2 
which show totals of 3.0m tons for 1700, 5.2m tons for 1750, 8.9m for 1775, 15.0m for 
1800, 22.3m for 1800 and 30.4m for 1830.  Mundella’s estimates, pp. 87-712 display a 
rise from 7.6m tons for 1790 to 15.6m in 1815. 
127 Flinn, History of the Coal Industry and offers a price index for coal moving from 100 
in 1775 to 123 in 1800 and 128 in 1830, well below the general rate of inflation. Coal 
used to smelt metals was tax free. While average costs of shipping coal to London 
1793-1815 was about double pre-war levels, W.J. Hausman, ‘The English Coastal Coal 
Trade, 1691-1910: How rapid was Productivity Growth?’ in Economic History Review, 
40 (1987), pp. 588-96. 
128 Legislation designed to enforce competition in the production and distribution of coal 
sold in London are discussed by P.Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition in the English 
Coal Trade, 1550-1850 (London, 1996) pp. 34, 39, 59 and 79; R. Smith, Sea Coal for 
London (London, 1961), pp. 144-51; R. Stevenson, Observation on the Coal Trade in 
the Port of Newcastle (London, 1789); T.S. Ashton and J. Sykes, The Coal Industry of 
the Eighteenth Century (Manchester, 1929), pp. 211-15. 
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and energy for rival  competitors (Holland and France) on the mainland. 
129  
Over the second half of the eighteenth century coal fields beyond 
the boundaries of north eastern England were opening up and mines 
utilizing improved Newcomen and eventually Watt engines for drainage, 
haulage and winding and railed ways for carriage were providing cheaper 
access to the extending network of inland waterways.  Whether the 
diffusion of these technologies led to some or any increase in total factor 
productivity is less germane to the argument elaborated here which is 
concerned to draw attention to rising freight rates, higher export taxes, 
repeated interruptions to the timber trade – all associated with warfare – 
that operated to intensify the extension and deepening of coal mining in 
Britain. This more rapid the exploitation of coal and technologies 
associated with its diffusion as a source of energy and fuel for such heat 
intensive industries (as iron, copper, glass, salt, brewing sugar) pulled  
owners and managers of the coal industry into another “cage” of fixed 
investments and commitments that promoted and maintained a trajectory 
for long term development for the heavy industries of the first industrial 
revolution both during the war and thereafter over the difficult decades of 
post war adjustment and deflation. 130  
To sum up, after the war and as all indices show, British industry 
rebounded. Major industries such as iron, coal and shipbuilding improved 
upon their capacities for  growth built up in the hothouse conditions of a 
wartime economy by  cutting costs, diffusing materials and technologies 
with demonstrable potential for future improvement and above all by 
holding onto the advantages of entry and access to foreign and imperial 
 
129 Customs 10901 and C. Beaumont, Treatise on the Coal Trade (London, 1789) pp. 
34-35 and 211-12. 
130 The technologies of the extraction of coal and their diffusion are discussed by R.L. 
Galloway, Annals of Coal Mining (London, 1893); Ashton and Sykes, Coal Trade of the 
Eighteenth Century and Flinn, British Coal Industry. 
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been secured and thereafter retained by the hegemonic power of the 
Royal Navy, conjoined to the competitive superiority of Britain’s 
mercantile marine with its linkages to the Island’s expanded and 
competitively superior shipbuilding industry. Is it not necessary for
historians to investigate how warfare might have on balance promo
transition from one set of trajectories for industrial growth to another and 
potentially superior set that came on stream once peace returned.  
 
 
T
Mercantilist Conflict and the Culmination of Britain’s Maritime 
Strategy for Security with Economic Growth 
Metternich, Talleyrand and other European state
ngress of Vienna, recognized that the Peace Treaty of 1815 
marked a conjuncture in great power politics when the Royal Navy h
secured indisputable command of the oceans. 131   The kingdom  
possessed the largest fleet of merchant vessels,  workforce of skil
seamen and shipbuilding capacity in the world. 132  During the wars 
London, Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool, Hull, Newcastle  and numerous
port cities had extended their harbours,  shipyards, commercial 
organizations, financial intermediaries and networks of merchan
required to continue to reap extraordinary shares of future gains fro
integration of a world economy as it moved along a trajectory of more 
peaceful expansion under the undisrupted hegemony of the Royal 
Navy.133  Henry Dundas (the Minister For War) had anticipated this 
 
131  C. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh. 
132 R. Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990); G. Bayley, Tables 
 British Empire (London, 1844); A. 
don, 
d  in several publications by Feinstein. Vide: C.F. Feinstein and S. Pollards 
Showing the Progress of the Shipping Interest of the
Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (Lon
2005). 
133 Estimates for infrastructural expenditures on ports and their facilities have been 
publishe
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outcome in his memorandum to Ministers as early as 1800 when he
wrote: “It is obvious that the present strength and pre-eminence of thi
country is owing to the extent of its resources arising from its commerce
and its naval power which are inseparably connected.” 134  
Crowding out, misallocation and destruction of nation
rtainly occurred as unavoidable costs of participation in twenty-
three years of warfare. Nevertheless, when the currency returned to th
gold standard in 1819 the real present values (expressed in international
purchasing power parities of that time) for the kingdom’s natural 
endowments (land, minerals and coal); its stocks of private fixed,
circulating and human capital, its augmented supplies of useful 
knowledge, its battleships, fortifications, bases and stores of wea
the defence of the realm and protection of its commerce and assets 
overseas all became available to an economy on the move and well 
placed to take advantage of opportunities flowing from the rebound a
expansion of the post war global economy. 135  
Britain’s prolonged mobilization for succes
er with the disruption to rival port cities by French and other 
European armies fighting on the mainland had certainly left the ma
sector of the Island’s economy  with expanded and probably more 
efficient capacities to take advantage of opportunities for engaging 
servicing of overseas trade and commerce. A quarter of a century of  
complementary expenditures by the state and the private sector for the
maritime infrastructures: for the training of seamen; for the expansion a
                                                                                                                                                                         
(eds.), Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom, 1750-1920 (Oxford, 1988). 
Structural improvements to the commercial organization surrounding trade has been 
analysed by Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain and Nash, ‘The Organization of 
Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy’, pp.95-152. 
134 The Dundas Memorandum is in Pitt Papers 30/8/207 dated 31.3.1800. 
135 J.B. Williams, British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion, 1750-1850 (London, 
1972) A. Herman, To Rule the Waves. How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World 
(London, 2005). 
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reorganization of the mercantile and financial networks  available  to 
coordinate, fund, insure and transport increasing volumes of merchand
and passengers by sea to every part of an integrating world economy had 
all been raised as an outcome of warfare to levels and possibly to 
standards that could not have been anticipated before the outbreak of 
revolution in France. 136  
With the exception of the conflict with the United States and i
European allies, opportunities to displace and replace competitors for th
gains from trade and serv
e of the first Anglo-Dutch War of 1651 onwards. 137 The 
destruction, degradation and depreciation of the rival mercantile sectors 
of France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia, Russia, India 
and, after 1808, the United States, competing for these gains se
however, to have occurred to an unprecedented degree during the war 
with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Intensified predation by 
British privateers (supported by their all-powerful Royal Navy) inflicted 
relatively more serious losses on the enemy and neutral shipping, sailing
along lanes connecting the economies of Europe and their seaborne
trades with the Americas, Africa, Asia and Australasia.  That conflict also 
witnessed a sequence of dislocations of port cities on the mainland, 
disruptions occasioned by Napoleon’s intrusive but unsuccessful 
 
136 C. Wright and C. Fayle, A History of Lloyds (London, 1928); P.K. O’Brien, ‘The 
Hanoverian State and the Defeat of the Continental System,’ in R. Findlay et al (eds.), 
Eli Heckscher, International Trade and Economic History (Cambridge, Mass, 2006) pp. 
373-407; The contemporary commentator, C. Moreau documents and quantifies 
Britain’s enhanced competitive position in the world economy over this period. Vide 
Moreau, Chronological Records and State of the Trade of Great Britain. 
137 P. Crowhurst, The Defence of British Trade 1689-1815 (Folkestone, 1977). C. 
Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (Cambridge, 1957) 
and England’s Apprenticeship, 1603-1763 (London, 1965); L. Gomes, Foreign Trade 
and the National Economy  (Basingstoke, 1987); K.E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories 
(Toronto, 1944); N. Koehn, The Power of Commerce. Economics and Governance in 
the First British Empire (Ithaca, 1994); 
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continental system; as well as the forcible opening of Iberian, Dutch, 
French, Ottoman and Mughal empires to British trade. 138   
Looking back from that vantage point of the Congress of Vie
seems anachronistic not only to ignore the averted threat of military 
invasion to concentrate upon hypothetical opportunity costs
 the long term material advantages and potential  that the maritime
and connected sectors of the Island kingdom’s economy derived from
engagement and final victory over France and its allies. Command of the 
oceans not only consolidated and maintained external security conjoined 
to internal stability for a society undergoing rapid urbanization, but 
Britain’s naval hegemony brought to a virtual close centuries of violence 
at sea and contained all prospects for a resurgence of European colonial 
warfare in the Americas, South and East Asia and Africa. 139  By 18
geopolitical preconditions were in place for the formation of a liberal 
international economic order that would allow overseas trade to widen 
geographically; help to integrate more regions into global markets for 
commodity, trade  and services, promote the movements of capital a
labour and stimulate the diffusion of technologies to a degree 
inconceivable during an ancien mercantilist economic order. 140  
                                                            
138 J. Lynch, ‘British Policy in Latin America, 1783-1808’, in Journal of Latin American 
Studies, 1 (1969), pp. 1-30; H. R. C. Wright, ‘The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in the East, 
1814-24’, in Economic History Review, 3 (1950), pp. 232-46; A. Frost, The Global 
Reach of Empire.  Britain’s Maritime Expansion in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 1764-
, 
s, Estimates of the Comparative Strengths of Great Britain; Lowe, Present 
al 
ondon 
 
 
 (London, 2000) and G. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (London, 1994). 
1815 (Carlton, 2003); Jones, Britain and the World; P. K. O’Brien and A. Clesse (eds.)
Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001 (Aldershot, 
2002).  
139 Roger, Command of the Oceans.  For contemporary views of the economic state 
and status of Britain and its empire within the global economy of the day read 
Colquhoun, Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire; 
Chalmer
State of England; Moreau, Chronological Records of the British Royal and Commerci
Navy and numerous other booklets in the Goldsmiths Collection, University of L
Library. 
140 J. Klaits and M. Hatzel (eds.), The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution
(Cambridge, 1994);C.A. Bayley, The Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the 
World, 1780-1830 (London, 1989); W.R. Thompson, The Emergence of Global Political
Economy
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strong advantages and opportunities for the Island’s industrializing 
Britain emerged from the wars with revolutionary France
position in a new international economic order with an extended t
e , naval bases in every part of the world and an  enlarged and 
more efficient maritime sector linked to   export industries poised to sell 
higher high shares of their outputs overseas. Meanwhile the economie
France, Portugal, Spain, Holland, Denmark, Venice, Russia, even the 
United States and other rivals,  slowly recovered many of the competitive 
advantages for trade that they had possessed or were developing 
between the Peace of Paris (1783) and the outbreak of the French 
Revolution six years later. This relative decline of rivals made space for 
the Island’s maritime sector, which since the times of Cromwell, had
played a major part in leading the economy to a plateau of opportunities 
from where a sustainable transition to an industrialized economy wou
not be checked either by the relatively small size of the United Kingdom’s
home market or by the risks to specialization from potential shortages of
food and raw materials which attended the urbanization of a growing 
share of a workforce, generating increasing returns as it agglomerated in 
towns and factories. 141  
These positive outcomes flowing from victory in the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars  an
lture and industry add up to a representation of that conflict as a 
conjuncture in the kingdom’s economic history that brought a long
of mercantilism to a successful conclusion and thereby offered particula
economy. Such post hoc representations would not, moreover, have 
surprised mercantilists of the day who never hesitated to extol links 
                                                            
141 Schmoller had emphasized the geopolitics behind economic growth more than a 
century ago. See G. Schmoller, The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance 
(New York, 1967). His views are echoed by Findlay and O’Rourke in their recently 
published text, Power and Plenty; Jomo K.S. and E.S. Reinert The Origins of 
Development Economics. How Schools of Economic Thought Have Addressed 
Development (London, 2005) 
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between power with profit. 142  Classical economists and their liberal 
successors would, however, only accept the “realpolitic” embodied in a 
view that the unintended economic consequence flowing from 
mercantilism and warfare could, on balance, be positive for progress o
the First Industrial Revolution with deep scepticism. 143That stance o
antipathy to mercantilism seems, however, to be based upon neglect
superficial reading of recent scholarship in the history of economic 
thought. 144 Perhaps this ideologically unwelcome take and emp
positive connexions between investment for warfare and Britain’s 
economic progress could become more acceptable if and when it 
becomes possible to validate mainstream perceptions of the time with 
reference to a fully articulated and acceptable set of balance of pay
accounts  going back in time to say the mid-seventeenth century.  
Alas, prospects for quantifying Britain’s evolving economic 
relationships with the rest of the world (including its colonized econ
Ireland) over a revealing chronology (say from the passage of Cromwe
navigation act of 1651 to its repeal two centuries later) continue to  look 
entirely remote. Indeed a line of distinguished scholars who have 
led with the sources consider such accounts could not be 
constructed within acceptable margins of error. 145  
                                                            
142 L. Magnusson, Mercantilist Economics. 
143 Silbener, Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought; Mokyr, 
Enlightened Economy; for a critique read S. Rashid, 'Economists, Economic Historians 
and Mercantilism,’ in Scandinavian Economic History Review, 28 (1980) pp. 1-15 and 
R.K. Schaeffer, The Entelechies of Mercantilism, vol. 29 (1981) pp. 1-16. 
the Balance of Trade really Erroneous?’ in 
 
se of 
 
lution and British Overseas Trade and W. 
144 C. Perrota, ‘Is the Mercantilist Theory of 
History of  Political Economy, 23 (1991) pp. 301-35; ‘The Preclassical Theory of
Development: Increased Consumption Raises Productivity ,’ in History of Political 
Economy, 29 (1997) pp. 295-326; L. Magnusson, Mercantilism. The Shaping of an 
Economic Language (London, 1994). 
145 L.A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (New York, 1939); H.C. Hunter, How 
England got Its Merchant Marine, 1066-1776 (New York, 1935); R. Davis, The Ri
Atlantic Economies  (London, 1973) quantified what he could and historicized a 
plausible story. Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth; R. Davis, Rise of English
Shipping; R. Davis, The Industrial Revo
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Their scholarly caution seems, moreover, to have been vin
by the convincing critique made by Nash of estimate
Economic History Review for several items on the current account 
of the balance  of payments for benchmark years going back no further 
than 1710.  They include net earnings from shipping and mercantile 
profits, together with a set of guesses of net outflows or inflows derived 
from servicing Britain’s foreign debt. 146   Their compiler did not respo
his challenge to publish the procedures and data she utilized to construc
one of the standard and key components for  balance of payments 
accounts, namely commodity imports at current (cif) prices, or explain 
why her data for exports was not comprehensive. Yet this debate ov
numbers has been heuristic enough to confirm that the construction of 
acceptable estimates or even controlled conjectures for Britain’s balanc
of payments in current prices as Ralph Davis and Imlah told us, may no
be possible for the period before, say, the 1770s. 147   
Nevertheless, these modern attempts to envisage stylized balance 
of payments accounts lend support to perceptions (already familiar to 
ans and most contemporary commentators) on long term trends in 
the volumes of Britain’s commodity trade with the rest of the world bas
upon official statistics which refer to  exports and imports measured in 
constant prices.  This familiar but imperfect data is often used to estima
trends in rates of growth for seven decades between two periods of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Minchinton (ed.), The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries (London, 1969). 
146 E. Brezis, ‘Foreign Capital Flows in the Century of Britain’s Industrial Revolution: 
New Estimates, controlled Conjectures,’ in Economic History Review, 48 (1995); R. 
Nash, ‘The Balance of payments and foreign Capital Flows in Eighteenth Century 
England: a Comment,’ in Economic History Review, 50 (1997) pp. 110-125. E. Brezis, 
‘Did Foreign Capital Flows Finance the Industrial revolution?’ a reply in Economic 
History Review, 50 (1997), pp. 129-32. Her mimeo is cited but apparently not utilized in 
Cuenca-Esterban’s reconstruction of the accounts for 1772-1820. Vide J. Cuenca-
Esterban, ‘The British Balance of Payments, 1772-1820: Indian Transfers and War 
Finance,’ in Economic History Review, 54 (2001), pp. 58-86.  
147 Davis, Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade; Imlah, Economic Elements. 
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peaceful trade, 1717-21 to 1787-91, when average annual rates of growth
for volumes of retained imports (1.7%) and domestic exports (1.5%) we
not far apart. 148  Unless the  net  barter terms of trade were shifting  
against domestic exports, smuggling was on the increase, or debt 
servicing obligations to the rest of the world were already at high levels 
early on in the eighteenth century this data indicates there is no statistical 
basis for suggestions that a surplus of commodity imports over sever
decades of that century could not have been funded by earnings fro
invisibles (shipping, insurance, mercantile profits etc) which had reached
the magnitudes suggested by the lower bound estimates as constructed 
by Nash for 1700 and 1770.  
Thereafter (1772-75) and down to the outbreak of the wars with 
France (1788-92) when the rate of growth for the volume of retained 
imports just about doubled and commodity exports (growing at around 2%
per annum) failed to keep up,
idened. 149 Furthermore they began to diverge at a time when 
earnings from invisibles also came under intensified, geopolitical and 
competitive pressures from the navies and merchant marines of rival 
economies (France, Spain, the Netherlands and the United States). From
the American declaration of independence in 1776 to the outbreak of 
with Revolutionary France in February 1793, volumes of re-exports 
leaving British ports remained at levels between twenty to thirty percen
 
148 This official set is the foundation for all attempts to construct estimates for exports, 
imports and re-exports in constant and current prices: vide: B. Mitchell, Abstract of 
British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962) section XI. See F. Crouzet’s classic 
article ‘Towards an Export Economy: British Exports during the Industrial Revolution,’ in 
Explorations in Economic History, 17 (1980), pp. 48-93.  The growth rates cited are 
based upon official values which are taken from Mitchell’s abstract. 
149 From 1772-1820 data on commodities imported, exported and re-exported are 
available from: Mitchell, Abstract; Davis, The Industrial Revolution and from 
Reconstructions published in several papers by Cuenca-Esterban whose papers are 
listed in the bibliography to the book edited by L. Prados De La Escosura, 
Exceptionalism and Industrialization. Britain and its European Rivals, 1688-1815 
(Cambridge, 2004).  
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below those attained before that conflict disrupted Atlantic and intra-
European trades. Since British earnings from services (and even 
commodity exports) sold overseas remained highly correlated to volu
of re-exports, official records for those trades (supported by Cuenca-
Esteban’s estimates in current prices) are congruent with the gloomy
assessments of the time that the years surrounding the American 
rebellion, war for independence and its immediate aftermath can be 
interpreted as a discernible setback for British naval power and the 
realm’s commerce overseas. 150 
Perhaps no study could quantify the macro-economic costs 
incurred by the British economy from the failed attempt by the Hanov
state to retain control over thirteen colonies in North America. Moder
historiography concurs with the v
t had inflicted serious geopolitical and economic setbacks to
nation’s ambition to rise to a position of political and economic hegemony 
in the world at large. 151  
A decade later Britain was at war again and although it may never 
be possible to construct balance of payments accounts that could  bring
really long term and rounded perspective on the economic significance of 
the warfare with France, 
 
150 Contemporary views (e.g. McPherson, Annals of Commerce vol. 4 (London, 1805) 
and post hoc assessments have been critically summarized and supported by S. 
an, 
er of 
ayments, 1757-1812,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 44 (2007), pp. 
feat. 
Conway, The British Isles and the American War of Independence; P. Marshal, The 
Making and Unmaking of Empires, Britain, India and America (Oxford, 2005); Ehrm
The Younger Pitt.; A. Christie, Wars and Revolutions 1760-1815 (London, 1982); 
Bowen, War and British Society; D. Syrett, Shipping and the American War, 1775-83 
(London, 1970);  Nash, ‘The Organization of Trade and Finance’; Koehn, The Pow
Commerce. 
151 J. Cuenca Esterban, ‘Balance of Payments and India’s Contribution to the British 
Balance of P
154-76; P. Marshal (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 2 and his essay, 
‘The Eighteenth Century Empire,’ in J. Black (ed., British Politics and Society from 
Walpole to Pitt (London, 1990) pp. 177-200;  H.M.. Scott, British Foreign Policy in the 
Age of the American Revolution (Oxford, 1990), p. 342, recognized that Britain’s 
“success ultimately depended on the existence of a strong and aggressive French 
State – a point documented convincingly by B . Simms, Three Victories and  a De
The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783 (London, 2007) 
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rated official and other data for exports, imports and re-exports and
published plausible estimates, in current prices, for net earnings derived 
from supplying shipping, banking, insurance, mercantile, military and the 
services of imperial governance to the world economy (including Irela
and India) for the period 1772 to 1820.  He has also ventured to construct 
controlled conjectures for the costs of servicing Britain’s balance of net 
indebtedness to foreigners. 152 This truncated but hard-won set of macro- 
economic estimates allows for a foreshortened  perspective on the 
conjuncture from 1793-1815 that exposes the place of warfare and 
colonization in narratives seeking to explain the history and evolution of 
the comparative advantages enjoyed by Britain within a globalizing world 
economy from 1793 to 1914.  Although increasing returns accruing 
the realm’s precocious industrialization continue to be analysed in d
and sophistication but its connexions to prior developments in shipping, 
financial, commercial, governmental services and ship-building for the 
kingdom’s seaborne trades and increasingly for world commerce at large
has moved away from centre stage in the writing of British economic 
history in recent decades. 153  
Yet there is a historiographical tradition favoured by previous 
generations of economic historians (led by Ralph Davis) who insisted on 
according strong significance to international trade and commerce. 154
That emphases may have bee
a-Esteban’s new data set can now be included in narratives o
Industrial Revolution to make the point that the maritime sector of the 
 
 
say by J. 
ic History of Britain (London, 2009); M. Daunton,  Progress and Poverty. An 
sh 
152  References to his impressive archival-based scholarship are listed in Prados De La
Escosura (ed.), Exceptionalism and Industrialization which includes an es
Cuenca Esterban, ‘Comparative Patterns of colonial Trade: Britain and its Rivals,’ pp. 
35-66. 
153 Allen, British Industrial Revolution and Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy. The 
Econom
Economic and Social History of Britain 1700-1850 (Oxford, 1995). 
154 R. Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry; The Industrial Revolution and Briti
Overseas Trade; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism. 
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British economy not only recovered from the conflict with the American 
colonies and their European allies (when returns from exports, re-exports 
and commercial services faltered) but took a leap upward to an altogether
higher plateau of possibilities and opportunities during the conflict with
revolutionary France. 155  
For that sector’s core activity, namely shipping, the index required 
to support the key hypothesis for any chapter of a mercantilist narrative is 
aspirational and one that measures cycles and trends in Britain’s share 
total ton miles of the world
hips from, say, 1651-1851.  In print we have Cuenca-Esterban’s 
unchallenged estimates of earnings from shipping for the years 1772-
1820. They  fall into line with several sets of official statistics submitted to 
Parliament by the Registrar General of Shipping. 156  His reports 
published in Journals of the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
and books by commentators of the day recorded:  
 
(a) the numbers and tonnage of vessels registered as British, 
Imperial ships; 
(b) the overall size of the workforce of seamen (
e
(c) shares of the tons of freight clearing (entering and leaving) British 
and Irish ports in
(d) The numbers and tonnage of vessels constructed within Brita
its empire and registered as Bri
 
 
 of British Shipping. 
ols. 
arkinson (ed.),Trade Winds, 1793-1814. 
155 S. Ville: English Shipping during the Industrial Revolution, 1770-1830 (1987); 
Harper, English Navigation Laws and Hope, New History
156 These data are printed in appendices to Journals of the House of Commons, v
57-71. 
157 C. Moreau, The State of trade of Great Britain with All Parts of the World (London, 
1822); P
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The Registrar’s reports and data indicate the share of freight 
carried into and out from the kingdom’s ports usually declined in wartim
w
ng had to be relaxed to allow neutral vessels to replace imperi
merchant ships and their crews who had been redeployed to serve in and
for the Royal Navy.  Between 1793 and 1815 that changed in three 
respects.  First, tonnage of freight clearing imperial ports in “British ship
rose sharply. Secondly, the tonnage constructed and registered as 
“British” built also increased over this period. Thirdly, the war for 
American independence seems to have been a serious setback for the 
upward progression of the kingdom’s shipping and  shipbuilding 
industries.  While the longer and more expensive conflict with 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars witnessed a pronounced expansion
in Britain’s capacities to build ships and to transport domestic, im
and foreign freight by sea to every port throughout the world ec
That capacity had certainly been augmented at the expense of enemies, 
rivals and competitors, both during and as the outcome of warfare at se
(and to some extent on land) by the victory over France and her allies and 
all other rivals for the gains from trade and commerce.        
Alternative hypotheses that the rise of Britain’s shipping and 
shipbuilding industries emanated basically  through higher rates of total 
factor productivity growth compared to the industries of its ri
er, be considered. That notion is untested and looks improba
Few contemporaries or historians made the claim and the state continue
for decades after 1815, to subsidize and protect both these industries. 159
                                                            
158 J. Marshall, A Digest of all the Accounts (London, 1833); Bayley, Tables showing 
the Progress of the Shipping Industry (Goldsmith’s Collection, London 1844). 
159 Davis in his magnus opus Industrial Revolution and Overseas Trade made no such 
/1481, 106/2055, 49/94 , 95/85 
uiry 
claim and for the state protection see Harper, English Navigation Laws Admiralty 
Papers at the Public Record Office  106/1457, 106
dealing with relations between the Navy Board and private yards complain about the 
lack of  improvement in shipbuilding techniques. Commissioners for Naval Enq
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hemp, copper and iron) required to build fully rigged and equipped ships 
ready to sail the world’s seas and oceans became  foundational  for 
For shipbuilding there seems to be almost no indications of 
productivity change for a multinational industry producing a 
geneous range of ships designed for a multiplicity of special
tasks, located around the coasts of Eurasia. The designs, te
and techniques and skills utilized to construct ships for specific purpose
seem to have been accessible to many firms in several European 
countries, the United States and India. Innovations could, moreover, be 
copied fairly easily from purchased or captured foreign boats, mode
blueprints. Technologies, techniques and skilled workers migrated easily
Apparently best practice and designs diffused readily from shipyard to 
shipyard.  Economies derived from agglomeration, specialization, the 
accumulation of skills, superior management and organization must, 
however, have emerged from site to site and reduced costs of product
below average in some countries before others. 160   Nevertheless the
limited and under-quantified secondary sources published on the 
construction of sailing ships for this period leaves us with nothing bette
than general impressions. First that Dutch shipyards seem to have
retained the competitive position they had built up over the centuries. 161  
Secondly, access to cheap sources of raw materials (timber, pitch, t
                                                                                                                                                                              
struction 
 historians 
eships. 
9). 
 Rise 
(Parliamentary Papers 1805 (2) and 1817 (4)) found no significant examples of 
technological change in shipbuilding for the Royal Navy from 1608 to 1805. 
160  G.P. Naish, ‘Ships and Shipbuilding,’ in C. Singer et al (eds.), History of 
Technology. Vol. 5 (Oxford, 1963), ch. 18. A more extensive literature on the 
construction of battleships suggests that technologies for the design and con
of sailing ships changed slowly and innovations diffused fairly rapidly.  Naval
do not make strong claims for national superiorities in the construction of battl
See Rodger, Command of the Oceans and D.H. Roberts (ed.), Eighteenth Century 
Shipbuilding. Remarks on the English-Dutch Navies (Rotherfield, 1992); J. Glete, 
Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building (Stockholm, 1993); B. 
Lavery, Nelson’s Navy. The Ships, Men and Organization, 1793-1815 (London, 198
161 R. Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800 (Amsterdam, 1978); D. Ormrod, The
of Commercial Empires. England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism 1650-
1770 (Cambridge, 2003). 
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competitive advantages.162   Thirdly, shipyards tended to move away from
larger port cities, like London and Amsterdam, in search of far cheaper 
supplies of labour.  For example, by the time of the American Revolution 
(1776) something like 40% of the tonnage of ships registered in Brita
imperial mercantile marine had been constructed in yards located along 
the coasts of colonies in North America (and to some minor extent in 
India) close to supplies of raw materials and labour, cheaper by far than 
inputs available to yards in or near the capital. London’s high wages 
promoted the migration of shipbuilding to “out ports” up the coast and 
around the Isles towards pools of cheaper labour in the North, Scotlan
and Ireland. 163Wars for American independence operated to raise the 
shipbuilding and  shipping industries of the United States along with t
of its allies - the Netherlands, France, Spain, Scandinavia and Russia -
into more serious rivals for the gains from servicing international trade 
and commerce. Competition continued and intensified after the Peace o
Paris and shows up in the new estimates for earnings from freight (1772-
92). Meanwhile the official data on shipping and shipbuilding worried 
mercantilist statesmen for more than a decade before the outbreak of w
with Revolutionary France in 1793. 164 Thereafter and for some twenty-
three years international competition for seaborne freight took place in a 
geopolitical environment of warfare and disruptions to  the internationa
                                                            
162 A. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, its Organization and Importance (London, 1944); Ville, 
English Shipping; Harper, English Navigation Laws. 
ing 1675-1775,’ in Economic History Review, 20 (1967) pp. 
ckinson (ed.), Britain and the 
f 
ommercial Negotiations with Europe, 1783-1793 (London, 
cial 
163 K. Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 
1993); Harper, England’s Navigation Laws; G. Walton, ‘Sources of Productivity Change 
in American Colonial Shipp
67-78; Syrett, Shipping. 
164 Cuenca Esterban, ‘Balance of Payments’; H.T. Di
American Revolution. Vide the pamphlets published by Lord Sheffield on the theme o
Strictures on the Necessity of Maintaining the Navigation and Colonial System of Great 
Britain (1804 Goldsmiths Collection, University of London Library) and J. Ehrman  The 
British Government and C
1962); J.E. Crowley, ‘Neo-Mercantilism and the Wealth of Nations: British Commer
Policy after the  American revolution,’ in Historical Journal, 33 (1994), pp. 334-60. 
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and the rest of the world over initial stages of the first industrial revolution 
. 
trade from which Britain’s shipping, shipbuilding and allied industries 
eventually emerged in clear positions of primacy. 
This positive outcome has been well documented by historians,
trade by trade, and has been referenced in classic
 and cycles for the British economy as a whole from 1789 to 181
165 The triumphal re-emergence of these two major industries from 
doldrums that accompanied the global conflict for American 
independence and from the fluctuations in their fortunes due to the u
and downs of twenty-three years of mercantilist warfare at se
on land, can be validated with reference to official familiar values (the 
proxy for volumes) of retained imports, domestic exports and re-exports 
for 1774-1821. 166      
Latterly and thanks to the seminal research of Cuenca-Esterban 
who has reconstructed
nts in current prices for the period 1772-1820, historians are now 
placed to offer plausible conjectures based upon superior data that 
reveals the evolution  of major connexions between the British economy
before, during and by including a chapter anyalysing potential outcomes 
emanating from wars at sea with France and her allies from 1793 to 1815
                                                            
165 Parkinson (ed.), Trade Winds. The secondary sources providing dense description 
trade by trade is surveyed by P.K. O’Brien,  Government Revenue 1793-1815 (D.Phil. 
thesis, Oxford, 1967) ch. 9. On growth and fluctuations at more macro levels in imports, 
exports and re-exports the classic studies are by Ashton, Economic Fluctuations;  
Gayer et al, Growth and Fluctuations and Crouzet, Le blocus:  W. Schlote, British 
Overseas Trade, 1700-1930 (London, 1952). 
166  Mitchell, Abstract, p. 281; appendices to Journals of the House of Commons, vols. 
51-71. Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers; Marshal, Digest of all the 
Accounts; Moreau, State of Trade; C. Moreau, Chronological Records of the British 
Royal and Commercial Navies (Goldsmiths Collection, London, 1827). The approach to 
Britain’s foreign commerce exemplified by the works of Ashton, Gayer and Crouzet 
cited  above may leave the impression that the war years generated not only instability 
but severely depressed the prospects for British trade. Again that was not the view of 
the day – vide. A.D. Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century;  Ehrman, The 
Younger Pitt. The Consuming Struggle. 
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relatio ture 
Cuenca-Esterban is generous in his references to the archival
scholarship of others and appropriately cautious about data that he 
continues to refine and revise. His estimates have been recast in 
summary form in order to draw inferences from the figures in Table X that
fall into line with contemporary views of Britain’s international economic 
ns and standing vis à vis its competitors for this critical conjunc
in the Island’s history.  
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TABLE X 
Estimates of External Flows to and from Great Britain and the Rest of the World 1772-75 to 1816-20 in £ million in Current Prices 
Categories 1772-75 1176-83 1784-92 1793-1802 1803-07 1808-15 1816-20 
        
1. Domestic Exports (fob) 13.7 12.4 19.2 32.2 37.3 43.2 41.5 
2. Re-exports (fob) 7.0 5.2 5.1 10.8 10.0 15.9 13.5 
3. Imports (cif)  
includes a guess for illegal imports 
 
22.3 
 
21.2 
 
27.5 
 
45.5 
 
52.6 
 
62.0 
 
59.9 
4. Retained Imports (3-2) 15.3 16.0 22.4 34.7 42.6 46.1 46.4 
5. Balance of Commodities Trade 
(Net Imports or Deficit  (4-1)) 
 
-1.6 
 
-3.6 
 
-3.2 
 
-2.5 
 
-5.3 
 
-2.9 
 
-4.9 
6. Balance on Services Account 
from Shipping, Insurance, 
Mercantile Profits 
 
 
4.0 
 
 
5.2 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
10.6 
 
 
10.3 
 
 
14.2 
 
 
8.3 
7. Balance of Commodities and 
Services (6-5) 
 
2.4 
 
1.6 
 
1.7 
 
8.1 
 
5.0 
 
11.3 
 
3.4 
8. Net Transfers To and From 
Rest of the World 
       
(a) Theatres of warfare 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -4.4 -2.3 -16.2 -0.6 
(b) India 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 
(c) Migrants -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Total Transfers 0.3 0.2 0.9 -4.2 -2.5 -16.8 -0.9 
(d) Debt Servicing Charges        
(-) or Receipts (+) 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 1.8 2.1 2.3 
9. Balance on Current Account 2.5 0.9 2.2 3.8 4.4 -2.4 4.9 
10. Capital Account        
(a) Changes in Reserves 2.9 0.2 1.8 0.6 0.7 -0.3 1.6 
(b) Inflows or Outflows of Capital -0.4 0.7 0.4 3.2 3.8 -2.1 3.3 
11. Net Accumulated Balance of 
Claims against Foreigners 
-13.0 -7.8 -4.5 27.7 46.6 30.0 46.4 
 
Sources: Data reconstructions by J. Cuenca Esteban in papers cited in Bibliography to L. Prados De La Escosura (ed.) Exceptionalism and 
Industrialization. Britain and it’s European Rivals, 1688-1815 (Cambridge, 2004).
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Several points not unfamiliar to historians of the period, have been 
clarified by this new data set. For example, domestic exports first 
declined, then recovered slowly from the American War of Independence 
and despite periods of boom and crises associated with the conflict with 
Revolutionary France increased over time in volume at a much faster rate 
between 1789 -1819 than they had over the two decades preceding 1793. 
This wartime upswing was marked by shifts in their composition (heavily 
into cotton textiles) and a clear geographical diversification - away from 
Europe towards markets in India, China, Latin America and, above all,  
the United States. 167   Correlation is rarely causation and after a 
protracted and unresolved debate on linkages between exports and 
industrialization it has now been recognized that an overall view of that 
contested connexion could only be pursued towards a settled conclusion 
by locating and analysing case by case, cycle by cycle, commodity by 
commodity evidence for volatile changes in foreign demands for British 
commodities. 168  Meanwhile theoretically inspired exercises based 
entirely on British statistics and founded upon models designed to 
separate out and to quantify endogeneous compared to exogeneous  
forces behind increased industrial output and the rapid but erratic 
expansion of exports from a base period before the war (1788-92, down 
to its immediate aftermath (1816-20) and upward thereafter through a 
 
167 Cuenca-Esteban and in a brilliant unpublished Cambridge thesis by Simon Smith – 
summarized in Economic History Society Annual Conference,  Session 7 ‘The Impact 
of the Discovery of the Americas, 1492 on Europe (Leicester, 1992). Crafts’ discussion 
of the problem in his classic text, British Economic Growth, pp. 124-36, which 
elaborates on the complexities involved in quantifying inter-sectoral connexions in a 
growth process.  He insisted on the significance of exports. 
168 For recent surveys of the protracted debate on connexions between trade and 
Britain’s precocious inductrialiization see K. Harley, ‘Trade discovery mercantilism and 
technology,’ in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of 
Modern Britain (Cambridge, 2004), p. 175-204 and J. Cuenca Esterban, ‘The Rising 
Share of British Industrial Exports in Industrial Output 1700-1851.’ In Journal of 
Economic History, 52 (1997) pp. 879-906 and ‘Comparative Patterns of Colonial Trade 
and India’s contribution to the British Balance of Payments. See also P. Maw, 
‘Yorkshire and Lancashire  Ascendant: England’s Textile Exports to New York and 
Philadelphia,’ in  Economic History Review,  62 (2009) pp. 1-35. 
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period of settled peaceable international economic relations (in the 1820s 
and 1830s) have run into diminishing heuristic returns and look 
ontologically unreal.  
Complex “loops of inter-connexions” between British industry and 
its imperial and foreign markets overseas are probably impossible to 
disentangle.  Theories imported from an array of competing models 
available in economics journals in order to engage with the utopian 
aspiration of factoring out the manifold influences on the growth and 
fluctuations in industrial exports flowing overseas during some twenty-
three years of warfare and its aftermath could be represented as under-
specified and un-quantified. 169  
Yes, warfare augmented risks for merchants trading beyond the 
shores of the realm. But it also widened opportunities, opened up new 
markets, degraded foreign competition, augmented fiscal and monetary 
incentives and offered naval protection to an extended range of nouveau 
businessmen, shippers and bankers (including asylum seekers from the 
mainland), described at the time by the mercantile establishment as 
socially inferior “speculators” who engaged recklessly  with overseas 
trade and commerce in wartime. 170 According to Crafts, shares of 
industrial output collected, funded and insured for sale overseas, jumped 
from 22% in 1780 to reach 53% by 1831. And Cuenca-Esteban’s revision 
to Craft’s  estimates suggest an even more pronounced leap from 14% to 
46% over that same period. 171  Export volumes certainly rose more 
rapidly than manufactured outputs during the wars which thereby 
 
169 J.G. Williamson, New Views on the Impact of the French Wars on Accumulation in 
Britain (Harvard University Discussion Paper 14890, 1990) for a defence of economic 
theories that purport to  “factor out” wars. 
170  P.K. O’Brien, ‘Merchants and Bankers as Patriots or Speculators. Foreign 
Commerce and Monetary Policy in Wartime,’ in J. McCusker and K. Morgan (eds.), The 
Early Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, 2000). This book also includes chapters by 
Engerman and Crouzet concerned with trade. The classic article on commerce in this 
period is Crouzet, ‘Wars , Blockades and Economic Change in Europe’. 
171 Cuenca-Esterban, ‘The Rising Share of Industrial Exports.’ 
  
74
                                                           
compensated industry’s need for markets at a time when domestic 
demand was being depressed by higher and higher rates of taxation. 
Some (and probably a “substantial”) part of the rising share of total 
domestic industrial output sold overseas over these years can surely be 
attributable to the relative advantages that the British economy derived 
from the power of its Navy at sea and because fiscal and financial policies 
pursued by the government operated to promote trade and commerce 
with places beyond the reach of taxation, which was narrowing markets at 
home.172 During the wars from 1793 to 1815 Britain also recovered, 
consolidated, and thereafter retained a hegemonic position as the world’s 
“emporium” for transcontinental trade and commerce. 173 Again this 
outcome can be read as the restoration of a trajectory in operation from 
1651 down to the loss the American colonies in 1783. That progression 
was interrupted between the years of 1772-75 and 1790-93 (years that 
preceded, accompanied and followed the war for American 
Independence) and the outbreak of the French Revolution – a period 
when volumes and values of re-exports  distributed, financed, insured and 
shipped across continents by British commercial enterprises remained 
almost flat. Fortuitously, during the wars from 1793-1815 geopolitical 
conditions affecting the operations of international trade and commerce 
changed in ways that, in outcome, redounded to the long-term advantage 
of the British economy. Prices for shipping, insuring, financing and 
organizing the carriage of freight overseas all rose to very high levels. 
 
172 J. Beckett and Turner, ‘Taxation and economic growth, pp. 377-403. 
173 C.N. Parkinson, Britannia Rules. The Classic Age of Naval History, 1793-1815 
(London, 1977); P. Gauci, Emporium of the World. The Merchants of London, 1660-
1800  (London, 2007) depicts the London emporium at work and Hancock and other 
historians have explained how, when and why Britain acquired such extraordinary 
shares of the gains from servicing world trade – Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in 
Britain; A. Olson, Making the Empire Work: London and American Interest (Cambridge, 
Mass. 1992); D. Hancock, ‘The British Atlantic World: Coordination, Complexity and the 
Emergence of an Atlantic Market Economy 1651-1815,’in Itinerario, No. 23 (1999), pp. 
107-26.  
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Under superior protection from the Royal Navy British mercantile firms 
responded  to “capture” extraordinary shares of the returns from the sale 
of the commercial services associated with the distribution of both 
domestically produced and foreign commodities sold on to European, 
American and other world markets. 174   
At the time contemporaries became well aware of the gains from 
the accelerated rise of London and other British ports to become far and 
away the leading entrepôt for world commerce through the rhetoric of 
politicians, who referred with pride to official data recording large 
increases in imports and re-exports. Ministers also recognized, debated 
and investigated the recurrent and cyclical problems of “gluts” of foreign 
produce (mercantile inventories) lying unsold in the realm’s warehouses 
when the French and American governments managed to  block and 
disrupt normal channels for British trade. 175  
By value approximately three quarters of the returns from this 
commercial activity came from shipping tropical groceries (sugar, tea, 
coffee, spices, tobacco etc) and raw materials (cotton fibres, thrown silk, 
dyestuffs, hardwoods etc) from Asia, Africa and the Americas onto the 
mainland of Europe. Marine insurance also prospered in risky wartime 
 
174 Parkinson (ed.), Trade Winds; Wright and Fayle, Lloyds; Moreau, State of the Trade 
of Great Britain; Bayley, Tables showing the Progress of the Shipping Interest of the 
British Empire, C. Shammas, ‘The revolutionary impact of European demand for 
tropical goods,’ in McCuster and Morgan, The Early Atlantic Economy, pp. 163-86 
discusses the inelastic nature of European demand for these exotic and luxury 
products. 
175 Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century,  chs 2 and 3. The official statistics 
were recorded in parliamentary papers and journals of the House of Commons. The 
inventory cycles of the period are analysed by Ashton, Economic Fluctuations, Gayer 
et al, Growth and Fluctuations and in Crouzet’s magnus opus, Le blocus. The most 
recent study of world trade in wartime is by K.O’Rouke, ‘The Worldwide Economic 
Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,’ in Journal of 
Global History, 1 (2006), pp. 123-51. He concluded that Britain gained relative to its 
rivals from the wartime disruption of evolution towards the integration of global markets.  
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conditions, but shipping retained its place as the most significant sub-
sector supplying international services. 176  
By the end of the war sales of commercial, financial, insurance and 
other services to continents and colonies beyond Europe and North 
America accounted for nearly 90% of Britain’s invisible exports. While 
warfare and dangers to external security of the realm lasted the 
augmented revenues from these services to foreign and colonized 
economies alike turned out to be more than sufficient to cover the deficit 
on commodity trade. With help from plunder and extortion from India they 
became sufficient to fund deficits on commodity trade (equivalent to some 
6% to 12% of retained imports) and to cover payments for naval and 
military operations overseas – restrained to fairly low levels before the 
commitment of a large army under Wellington to fight on the mainland of 
Europe from 1808-15. 177  
Finally, as Cuenca-Esterban’s  cautiously constructed accounts of 
international flows become acceptable as controlled conjectures they will 
also allow historians to represent the war years as marking a turning point 
when the British society (with sustained and indispensable help from the 
state) became transformed from a net debtor to a net creditor to the rest 
of the world. 178 By 1816-20 the kingdom’s assets located beyond its 
frontiers may have amounted to somewhere around £50 million  
(approximately 14% of the national income). By then Britons may have 
been receiving  inflows of returns from their investments overseas 
sufficient to fund about 7% of the country’s retained imports. 179   
 
176 Cuenca-Esterban, Balance of Payments and Ville, English Shipowning During the 
Industrial Revolution and W. Vaughan, Tracts on Docks and Commerce, 1793-1800 
(London, 1839); F. Crouzet, ‘Opportunity and Risk in Atlantic Trade in the French 
Revolution,’ in C.L. Holfreirich (ed.), Interractions in the World Economy (London, 
1990), p. 137. 
177 Cuenca-Esterban, ‘British Balance of Payments’ and ‘India’s Contribution.’ 
178 Jones, Britain and the World 1649-1815; Harvey, Collision of Empires, pp. 58-61; 
O’Brien and Clesse, Two Hegemonies. 
179 Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannia.  
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Once the conflict at sea was over and the advantages of naval 
protection and predation upon foreign (and neutral shipping) and other 
extortions associated with mercantilist warfare came to an end, European 
and American competitors recovered some of the revenues they had lost 
in wartime from financing and transhipping  commodities by sea around 
the world. Nevertheless Britain’s top position had been painfully secured. 
And as a liberal international economic order gradually emerged under 
the benign hegemony of the Royal Navy, the Island economy retained 
and built upon the extraordinary shares of the returns “seized” during an 
age of mercantilism from supplying, shipping, marine insurance, 
commercial and entrepôt services for the rest of the world economy 
(including its own  extended empire overseas). 180  
From 1815 to 1914  (the century of Pax Britannica) the economic 
significance of international services closely connected to the world’s 
leading shipbuilding industry (both jacked up along with the Royal Navy to 
positions of almost unassailable primacy during the wars with France) has 
been mapped statistically by Imlah’s classical study of 1958.As the British 
foreign secretary saw it in 1806: “The sea is ours and we must maintain 
the doctrine that no nation, no fleet, no cock-boat shall sail upon it without 
out permission.” 181  
Geopolitical conjunctures in history when the long run growth of 
national economies might well have been thrown off course in developing 
comparative advantages that depended upon the maintenance of external 
security and the retention of naval supremacy over rival powers 
competing for gains from trade and specialization (linked to technological 
 
180 O’Brien, ‘State Formation and the Construction of Institutions for the First Industrial 
Nation’. 
181 Harvey, Collision of Empires, pp. 80-82; K.J. Holsti, Peace and War. Armed 
Conflicts and the International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge, 1991). 
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change) are complex to model. 182 Early modern international history has 
never been an ontologically convenient arena for economic theories, 
however, rigorously designed to test connexions between trade and 
growth, except by resorting to unreal misleading and uninteresting 
counterfactuals of peace with free trade derived from Adam Smith’s 
premature advocacy of a more enlightened international economic order. 
If, however, we reread Imlah’s book and  reflect upon the shares of 
imports retained, consumed and utilized by the economy of the United 
Kingdom from 1815-20 to 1911-13 that were funded by net receipts from 
the sale of services to the empire and the rest of the world, supplemented 
in ever increasing proportion over time from inflows of dividends and 
interest from investments overseas, it becomes difficult to avoid the meta 
question of how, when and why that pattern of specialization (with 
externalities) connected to long run growth of the economy came to pass 
and was sustained for so long a time. 183 From a post hoc perspective 
might it not then seem anachronistic to underestimate the kingdom’s 
pursuit of a mercantilist strategy for development or to derogate 
expenditures incurred to defeat Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. 
After all, versions of mercantilism were supported by the mainstream of 
European economic thought between 1651 and 1846 and accepted as a 
sensible foundation for geopolitical policy by British Parliaments and 
governments of the day. 184  Smithian views continued to be as deviant 
and premature as universal suffrage, religious toleration, rights for 
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women, sexual freedom and other demands for “enlightenment” until well 
into the nineteenth century. 185   
Yet, the economic ramifications and significance of Britain’s victory 
over Revolutionary and Napoleonic France was widely recognized by 
European statesmen intellectuals and historians as a conjuncture in 
European and global history that marked the beginning of the end of that 
malign international economic order and represented retrospectively by 
economic historians as a midpoint of the First Industrial Revolution. 186  
Yet mercantilism may continue to retain its status as an irrational 
system of thought among economists who continue to read centuries of 
European writing in political economy teleologically as  economic theory 
in retrospect. 187 Historians don’t read it that way and will to insist on 
representing  the policies pursued by statesmen and the texts of their 
advisers in context. Historically, as Crouzet told us years ago, the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars find their genesis in a sequence of 
conflicts between Britain and France going back for more than a century. 
188  
Meanwhile to claim superiority for the insights derivable from 
attempts based on a modern economic theory and to factor wars out of 
an otherwise peaceful, but utopian, process of long run economic growth 
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and transformation are anachronistic exercises in theoretical speculation. 
Wars were part and parcel of that whole process and era. 189 At its 
culmination it was important to win in order to consolidate the gains from 
trade, commerce and colonization culminating since 1651 and to promote 
the kingdom’s transition to become the world’s first industrial market 
economy. 190 
My rhetorical and debateable speculation is that in significant 
respects the First Industrial Revolution can be plausibly represented as a 
paradigm example of successful mercantilism and that the unintended 
consequences of the Revolution in France contributed positively and 
perhaps “substantially” to its ultimate consolidation and progression. 
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